Summary

FDP Council of States member Andrea Caroni calls for a constitutional amendment for the new EU contract package – even though FDP delegates only wanted a simple popular majority. Caroni justifies this with potential conflicts with the constitutional provision on immigration control and the fundamental weight of the treaty. A cantonal majority significantly raises the hurdles and makes the package's failure likely. Caroni does not see this as sabotage, but as necessary for state policy. Regarding the distortion question caused by small cantons, he refers to federalist tradition – but acknowledges that reforms are conceivable in the long term.

People

  • Andrea Caroni (FDP Vice-President, Council of States member from Appenzell Ausserrhoden)
  • Adrian Vater (Political Science Professor)

Topics

  • EU contract package and constitutional amendment
  • Cantonal majority vs. popular majority
  • Federalism and canton weights
  • Freedom of movement rights and migration

Clarus Lead

Caroni divides his own party: While FDP delegates approved the package under a simple popular majority hurdle, he is fighting in parliament for a cantonal majority – which significantly complicates approval. His argument rests on a strict constitutional interpretation of immigration articles that he sees as violated. This reveals a fundamental conflict between federalist logic and modern majority will: small cantons receive disproportionate weight, which political scientists warn is a source of tension. Caroni justifies this as inevitable – yet his insistence shows how fragile the package's legitimacy foundations are.


Detailed Summary

Caroni draws a sharp distinction between party position and personal parliamentary responsibility. The FDP delegation did approve only a popular majority – but this was a "status report," the party leadership even suggested an optional referendum beforehand. In parliament, public hearings with constitutional law experts strengthened the strict constitutional interpretation: Article 121a of the Federal Constitution prohibits "new freedom of movement rights," but prescribes "contingents and maximum numbers." The EU package grants few new rights numerically (primarily for same-sex couples and their children), but establishes a "dynamic" – Switzerland declares itself willing to automatically accept future EU changes in this area. This is a fundamental commitment that goes beyond mere quantity debates.

Regarding criticism that ten legal professors share this position while the "great majority of legal scholars" hold a different view, Caroni pointed to the size and reputation of those ten (such as St. Gallen), but argues: "There is room for interpretation in the constitution." The Federal Council takes a loose interpretation, he takes a strict one. The package's emergency brake changes nothing about the fact that the initial commitment exists.

On federal weight: Political scientists warn that a cantonal majority requires 55% popular support, which will likely cause the package to fail. Caroni refuses to argue from this result. "The rules apply beforehand, then you see what people vote for." His canton's government, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, also spoke out for a cantonal majority – an alignment of interests that he defends as consistent with his principles. On the question of whether the cantonal majority is fair if the constitution does not prescribe it: Caroni emphasizes that cantons should fundamentally have "special weight," regardless of size. One idea in the debate: proportional weighting within cantons (e.g., if a canton votes yes by two-thirds, its cantonal majority counts only two-thirds). This would not disempower small cantons, but protect minorities. Caroni is open to this, but sees practical hurdles and admits: "Realistically, the cantonal majority will remain as it is for a very long time."


Key Statements

  • Caroni legitimizes his cantonal majority insistence through a strict constitutional interpretation, not through substantive opposition to the package.
  • The "dynamic" of automatic adoption of future EU regulations is rated as a bigger problem than the current numerical immigration effects.
  • A cantonal majority objectively increases the probability of failure – Caroni accepts this as a consequence of democratic rules, not as strategy.
  • The federal overweight of small cantons is structurally well-known and is accepted as legitimate in Switzerland, but is increasingly controversial.

Critical Questions

a) Evidence/Data Quality/Source Validity:

  1. How many additional persons would concretely immigrate under the EU package? The Federal Council says "negligible," Caroni cites possible scenarios (e.g., children of couples); on what empirical calculations do both positions rely?

  2. Caroni invokes "ten legal professors" – were these ten actually mentioned in full at the hearing, or is this a selection? What total number of constitutional law experts was heard?

b) Conflicts of Interest/Incentives/Independence:

  1. Caroni is a Council of States member from Appenzell Ausserrhoden, whose government demands a cantonal majority – does his canton structurally benefit from higher hurdles for EU treaties, and does this influence his position?

  2. The FDP party line previously went to mandatory referendum, then to popular majority – how binding are party conference decisions for parliamentarians, and when is a switch a legitimate matter of conscience vs. arbitrariness?

c) Causality/Alternatives/Counter-Hypotheses:

  1. Assuming the package fails because of the cantonal majority – is the risk of a strained EU-Switzerland relationship higher or lower than the risk of future automatic adoption of rules without popular control?

  2. Are there alternative mechanisms (e.g., opt-out clauses, broader emergency brake) that would solve Caroni's immigration concerns without forcing the full cantonal majority?

d) Feasibility/Risks/Side Effects:

  1. If a cantonal majority is introduced, does it apply only to this package or to all future EU treaties – with what long-term consequences for Swiss-ness action capacity?

  2. Caroni mentions that neighboring countries (France, Belgium) also have similar freedom of movement mechanisms – are their constitutions not similarly restrictive, and why do they accept this?


Further News

  • Caroni's Pacs Initiative: Caroni has submitted a draft law for a new legal form "Pacs" (Partnership Contract) – an intermediate form between cohabitation and marriage. He argues that today only two options (0–10 scale) exist and a third option would offer more freedom. Critics warn of unnecessary bureaucracy and a possible weakening of marriage. Caroni points to cantons (Geneva, Neuchâtel) and countries (France, Belgium) that already use such models.

  • Love Affair at the Federal Court: A federal judge and a federal judge were criticized for a relationship – they allegedly violated internal guidelines and possibly the Federal Court Act (which prohibits life partnerships between judges). Caroni, Vice-President of the Court Commission, admits that this leads to revision demands in existing rulings (e.g., Speerisen case). He calls for stronger disciplinary oversight of lower courts, but warns against too hasty judgments about the two judges.


Bibliography

Primary Source:

Saturday Round-up: Are You Sabotaging the EU Package, Mr. Caroni?SRF Daily Conversation / Saturday Round-up, 30.05.2026

Verification Status: ✓ 30.05.2026


This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-checking: 30.05.2026