Metadata
Language: German
Transcript ID: 34
Filename: 2250336-m-7dd20e6c1e8618d1b7f161ed2718e78a.mp3
Original URL: https://audio.podigee-cdn.net/2250336-m-7dd20e6c1e8618d1b7f161ed2718e78a.mp3?source=feed
Creation Date: 2025-12-26
Text Length: 38576 characters
People
Topics
- Credit Suisse crisis and responsibility
- Swiss financial center and major banks
- FDP and liberal center parties in crisis
- Direct democracy and pragmatism
- Switzerland-EU relations and bilateral treaties
- Corporate culture and risk management
- Internationalization of Swiss business
Summary
In this edition of NZZ Standpunkte, Erik Guyer discusses with prominent Swiss entrepreneur Walter Kielholz the Credit Suisse crisis, the future of Switzerland's financial center, and the country's political challenges. Kielholz defends his personnel decisions during his time at Credit Suisse and argues that the problems were not primarily due to corporate culture. He criticizes the ideological orientation of red-green city councillors in Zurich, supports robust equity capital for UBS, and advocates for a more pragmatic European policy stance by Switzerland.
Detailed Summary
Credit Suisse: Responsibility and Legacy
Walter Kielholz is directly confronted in the conversation with accusations that he and others are responsible for the downfall of Credit Suisse. However, he emphasizes that he deliberately refrained from publicly commenting on the CS crisis since reliable facts have not been available to him for twelve years. Kielholz argues that participants are bound to silence – for legal reasons – while non-participants speak all the louder. Regarding his personnel decisions, particularly the appointment of Brady Duggan as CEO, he evaluates these as successful. The financial crisis of 2008 was navigated "relatively well or even very well" under his co-responsibility. However, he refuses to name specific mistakes at CS and points out that every leadership leaves a legacy – both good and bad.
Banking Crises and Capital Questions
A central theme is the question of robust equity capital for major banks. Kielholz explains that banking crises are ultimately liquidity crises that occur when the balance sheet can no longer be refinanced because there is suspicion of insufficient equity capital. He fundamentally supports the position of Finance Minister Karin Keller-Sutter to require UBS to increase its equity capital, but warns against requirements that are too high and could endanger the business model. Swiss major banks have a structural problem: their home market is small compared to their size, unlike, for example, JP Morgan with a huge American retail business. This makes refinancing more difficult.
Corporate Culture vs. Business Model
When asked whether the "toxic culture" of Credit Suisse – oriented toward American investment banks with high bonuses – led to its decline, Kielholz responds with nuance. He does not see culture in generalizations, but in daily implementation, leadership, and risk management. During his time at Credit Suisse First Boston, he encountered many professionals with excellent understanding of their profession. The problem lay rather in private banking, where the rules were lax earlier in Switzerland. Investment banking per se is not bad – other banks run it successfully. However, UBS is now significantly reducing its investment banking business, which is a consequence of changed market structures.
The FDP and the Profile of Center Parties
Kielholz analyzes the weakness of the FDP in Switzerland. The party regularly loses percentage points of votes, even though there is potentially 25 percent of the electorate that is "fiscally conservative, open on foreign policy, progressive on social policy, and active on economic policy." The problem, in his view, is that liberal center parties fundamentally have a profile problem – they easily get caught in internal conflicts and find it difficult to take distinct positions. The FDP was also accustomed to bearing government responsibility, which brought with it the need to find support beyond the party. This dampened the party's profile in the modern media landscape and caused damage.
Direct Democracy and Zurich
On the topic of direct democracy and local politics, Kielholz criticizes Zurich's red-green city government for ideologically muddled solutions, such as the Tempo 30 initiative. He argues with numbers: of 240,000 eligible voters in Zurich, only about 27,000 voted SP – meaning 85 percent did not vote SP. To derive a mandate from this result to rebuild society, he considers "presumptuous." At the same time, he gives the Swiss citizen high marks – pragmatism is particularly evident in votes that affect the wallet. In the vote on the Juso inheritance tax initiative, the bourgeois majority prevailed, despite low voter turnout.
Kielholz argues that Switzerland votes consistently at the municipal and cantonal level because the issues are closer to people's hearts. At the federal level, popular initiatives are a progressive instrument for new ideas – one in ten is accepted, the others influence parliament. An important point: the 150,000 foreigners in Zurich are excluded from the political process. Kielholz supports voting rights at the municipal level and is convinced that this would not lead to a further shift to the left, but possibly the opposite.
Swiss Corporate Culture and Europe
When asked how he would describe Swiss corporate culture, Kielholz answers: "Conservatively rebellious." Switzerland is rather conservative and cautious in terms of social policy, fiscal policy, and especially foreign policy. Regarding Europe, Kielholz considers the European policy package acceptable. He was always against the EEA rejection and later pragmatically supported the bilateral path to "keep the damage in limits." However, he criticizes that Switzerland is overly precise through "Swiss Finish" and then blames the Europeans. There are plenty of opportunities to reduce regulatory density.
Kielholz also points to a paradox: on one hand, Switzerland is overcorrect in implementing rules; on the other hand, it is rebellious in its attitude. The conservative side shows itself in the fact that it is difficult to get rid of regulations once they have been introduced.
Business and Politics: The "Network"
The relationship between business and politics in Switzerland has changed. It was once closely intertwined, particularly through the militia army – in the staffs of battalions and regiments, commune presidents, CEOs, teachers, and civil servants would meet. That is over. The network now functions through biotopes like Avenir Suisse or informal meetings, but the tendency to move only within one's own milieu has become stronger.
Kielholz emphasizes that this is an advantage for Switzerland compared to Germany, where politics and business are more strictly separated. The exchange enables informal agreements involving politics and trade unions. However, the structure of modern Swiss business has fundamentally changed: Nestlé has 277,000 employees, only 15,000 of them in Switzerland. It is impossible to run such corporations with only Swiss nationals. Only about 15 percent of the equity capital of these large corporations can be raised by the Swiss capital market. This is also why the high proportion of foreign CEOs (60 percent in Switzerland, more than in Finland with 35 percent) is completely normal.
Crisis Responses and Emotional Attachment
Kielholz reflects on the political turning points that triggered estrangement between politics and business: the grounding of Swissair in 2001, the near collapse of UBS in 2008, the actual collapse of Credit Suisse. These crises had emotional effects. The grounding of Swissair was particularly painful because it was emotional – while American airlines regularly go into Chapter 11, this was a shock in Switzerland.
Interestingly, the Swiss have an emotional relationship with their major corporations that he has never observed in Germany. This is a cultural difference.
CEOs in Trade Dispute with Trump
Regarding the visit of six Swiss CEOs to the White House in the trade dispute with the US under Trump, Kielholz says that this is nothing new – Swiss business representatives have always advocated for national interests, only not publicly before. The risk today is greater because the White House under Trump must feed the news cycle every day, and thus these visits are very publicly aired.
Kielholz himself was in the White House more often than many federal councilors and has spoken with Chinese prime ministers – always about Switzerland, not about his company. These exchanges at the highest level are formal in nature and serve to support factual discussions at the specialist level. With the Mayor of Shanghai's Advisory Board, it was similar: initially he gave advice, later he received advice, in the end orders. "That is the short summary of globalization."
Key Statements
Walter Kielholz refuses to comment on Credit Suisse without facts and refers to legal obligations of participants to remain silent.
The personnel decision to appoint Brady Duggan as CEO, he evaluates as successful; the financial crisis of 2008 was navigated well under his co-responsibility.
Banking crises are ultimately liquidity crises; robust equity capital is crucial, but requirements that are too high can endanger the business model.
Corporate culture is not defined by generalizations, but by daily leadership, risk management, and management selection.
The FDP has a profile problem and cannot mobilize its potential of approximately 25 percent of the electorate.
Swiss direct democracy functions pragmatically: citizens decide rationally when the wallet is affected.
Red-green city councilors in Zurich pursue ideological rather than pragmatic solutions; broader support would be necessary.
Swiss major corporations are globalized; a high proportion of foreign CEOs is normal and inevitable.
The traditional network between politics and business (army, golf course, Rotary) no longer functions, but is replaced by informal biotopes.
Switzerland should become more pragmatic in European policy and accept the European policy package, instead of being overly precise in implementation and then blaming the Europeans.