Executive Summary
The Federal Council functions as a collective decision-making body without a formally equal member, acting more like a "constructive event" than a forum for dispute. Former Federal Chancellor Walter Thurnherr analyzes in his book the paradoxes of this institution: It often successfully manages acute crises, but systematically fails in early problem detection and strategic foreign policy. The central risk lies not in a lack of expertise, but in a structural blindness to geopolitical shifts – a pattern that has repeated itself over decades and increasingly puts Switzerland under pressure in a new "world disorder."
Persons
Topics
- Federal Council function and collegiality
- Foreign policy crisis management
- Government communication culture
- Institutional learning capacity
Clarus Lead
The Swiss Federal Council is a peculiar institution: seven people decide collectively without formal votes, and those who opposed keep it to themselves. This leads to stable governance – but also to systematic blind spots. Former Federal Chancellor Thurnherr reveals in a conversation with NZZ Editor-in-Chief Erik Guyer a structural problem: Switzerland often responds to crises professionally (UBS rescue, pandemic), but almost never foresees them. Instead, a recurring pattern emerges of denial, forced capitulation, and superficial processing – a system that is increasingly becoming a risk in the multipolar world.
Clarus Original Analysis
Clarus Research: The conversation identifies a four-phase crisis model that has historically repeated itself (1940 France invasion, 1990s dormant assets, 2008 banking secrecy, 2022 Trump tariffs): denial → external demand → capitulation → GPK report. This regularity suggests structural system errors, not individual ones.
Classification: The conflict between Thurnherr's statement ("crisis management is good") and factual findings (Credit Suisse 2022, Trump 39% tariffs, energy strategy) reveals an institutional dilemma: The Federal Council is a decision-making body, not a strategic reflection authority. This is an advantage in stable times (fast, consensual), but becomes a disadvantage in times of geopolitical disruption.
Consequence: Switzerland must decide whether it wants to shift its foreign policy from reactive to preventive – or whether it accepts the risk of repeated surprise by global power shifts (Trump, China, EU regulation). This requires institutional reforms (regular security retreats, long-term foreign policy planning), not just better communication.
Detailed Summary
Structure and Role of the Federal Chancellor
The Federal Chancellor is, contrary to popular perception, not an "eighth Federal Councilor." He has no co-decision rights, but influences through preparation, conversations with department heads and active discussion participation. Thurnherr positions himself between "obedient secretary" and "mafia consigliere": he advises, points out legal facts, but does not vote. This role enables influence without responsibility – a characteristic feature of the Swiss system.
Conflict Culture in the Collegium
Federal Council meetings are deliberately designed as "constructive events" where disputes do not occur – at least not officially. Differences are clarified before or after the meeting. When conflicts do arise (such as between Karin Keller-Sutter and Viola Amherd over the defense budget question), informal mediation occurs through the Federal Chancellor. After the meeting, they eat together – a ritualistic "reconciliation instrument," which is further supported by wine in Bern. However, this harmony is partly a facade. Departmentalization means that colleagues deliberately "let the affected person run," because this person must bear the political consequences, not they.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Federal Council
Strengths: The Federal Council manages manifest crises – UBS rescue 2008, Credit Suisse crisis 2023, COVID-19 pandemic – with relative efficiency. An example is the flood regulation introduced after 1999, which functions comprehensively.
Weaknesses: Preventive capabilities are minimal. Thurnherr identifies a four-phase pattern that repeats across generations:
- Phase 1 (Denial): Experts warn, but Switzerland rejects (dormant assets in the 1950s, banking secrecy in the 2000s).
- Phase 2 (External Demand): States or international organizations (WTO, World Jewish Congress) issue ultimatums.
- Phase 3 (Capitulation): Switzerland quickly backs down (AIA, banking secrecy reform).
- Phase 4 (Superficial Processing): GPK report, then the game begins anew.
The Energy Strategy Case Study
Doris Leuthardt developed an energy strategy based on "permanently low energy prices." In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, geopolitics destabilized. The Federal Council "waved the business through," despite legitimate questions: abandonment of nuclear energy, dependence on renewable imports from abroad. Today it is clear: the EU has less electricity than expected, electricity shortages threaten, Switzerland pays the bill.
Thurnherr argues that in 2014 the alarm mood was not as great as today – a weak excuse given that the then Foreign Minister Didier Burkhalter was OSCE President and was following Ukraine-Russia conflicts live.
Foreign Policy Blindness
Switzerland acts in foreign policy according to an implicit pattern: "Stand aside, minimal commitment, maximum flexibility." This worked after 1945 and the end of the Cold War. But since 2014 (Crimea), 2022 (Ukraine invasion), 2024 (Trump's return), it becomes clear: the "sluggish village assembly" of world politics is now a "schoolyard without supervision, where elbows are thrown."
In this new order, Switzerland is "more the second grader among sixth graders." It can no longer hope that rule of law and regulations will protect it.
The Trump Debacle 2024
After 39-percent tariffs, confusion initially reigned in the Federal Council. The Finance Department (Karin Keller-Sutter) claimed leadership as Federal President. The Economics Department (SECO) wanted the lead because it negotiates trade agreements. A special envoy was added. Valuable time passed. Great Britain, by contrast, engaged a Trump confidant, built an argumentation framework, coordinated a timeline.
Thurnherr remains evasive here ("I abstain"), but his book quote reveals the criticism: "Muddling through is the essence of Swiss foreign policy."
Crisis Management vs. Crisis Forecasting
Thurnherr criticizes the practice of treating crises as "episodes" rather than symptoms of structural shifts. After each crisis, the refrain is: "Good, over, back to normal." No learning effect remains. The 1999 floods led to better regulations – but only because the disaster was obvious. Geopolitical shifts are more subtle; they are overlooked.
Communication: Too Little or Too Much?
The Federal Council long showed communication reluctance (until the 1980s). Today there are more communication staff, but Thurnherr sees a dilemma: when Federal Councilors are present, they seem accusatory. When silent, they seem secretive.
Specific examples of inadequate communication:
- Credit Suisse Fall 2022: No joint statement from Federal Councilor Karin Keller-Sutter and National Bank Chief Thomas Jordan ("whatever it takes").
- August 1, 2024: Federal President Keller-Sutter mentions the 39-percent tariffs not a word in her address.
- Grosmont 2024: Federal President Guy Parmelin breaks off his prepared New Year's address but does not recover through a subsequent statement on the crisis.
Key Findings
- The Federal Council is an efficient crisis management institution, but a poor crisis prevention institution.
- The four-phase pattern (denial → external demand → capitulation → superficial processing) repeats over decades.
- Foreign policy was historically treated as a marginal issue; today it is central, but the structure has not been adapted.
- Collegiality and harmony are partly facade; behind the scenes there is departmentalization and strategic "letting" of colleagues.
- Switzerland is losing its historical strategy of neutrality and aloofness in the multipolar "world disorder."
Stakeholders & Those Affected
| Stakeholder | Affected? | Benefits? | Loses? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Swiss Export Economy | Yes – tariffs, sanctions | No | Yes – directly by tariffs (2024), indirectly by uncertainty |
| Financial Sector | Yes – banking secrecy, regulation | Historically benefited from delay | No – longer-term through instability |
| Federal Council (Collegium) | No – itself beneficiary | Yes – through harmony, consensus | No – except reputation risk |
| Federal Chancellor | Yes – must mediate differences | No | Yes – indirectly bears responsibility without co-decision rights |
| Public / Voters | Yes – bears consequences of crises | No | Yes – surprised crisis response instead of prevention |
| Neighboring Countries (EU, USA) | No | Yes – can surprise Switzerland | No |
Opportunities & Risks
| Opportunities | Risks |
|---|---|
| Collegial decision-making protects against autocracy | Denial of problems leads to late crises |
| Consensus capability enables rapid implementation in crises | Lack of long-term strategy in foreign policy |
| Federal structure preserves stability | Dependence on media pressure rather than self-initiative |
| Historical neutrality model was successful (1945–2000) | Neutrality in multipolar world no longer viable |
| Communication staff grow without crisis recognition increasing | |
| Reputation risk through repeated surprises (UBS, CS, Trump) |
Action Relevance
For Political Decision-Makers
- Structural Reforms: Regular security retreats (not just ad hoc; at least 1–2 × per year for 1–2 days) with external experts on geopolitics, technology, climate change.
- Foreign Policy Strategy Document: A 5–10-year scenario paper on Switzerland's role in the "world disorder" – not just reactive positions.
- Communication Protocol: Clear rules for who speaks in crisis situations (Foreign Minister, Federal President, Coordinator). Not multiple voices in parallel.
- Institutionalize Early Warning: A department or task force that collects warning signals and regularly presents them to the Federal Council.
Observation Indicators
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