The F-35 Deal: How the USA Uses Military Dependence as a Geopolitics Instrument

Summary

Security expert Heiko Borchert analyzes in this podcast how the planned delivery of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia triggers geopolitical tensions – particularly for Israel, which has hitherto held the monopoly on this state-of-the-art system in the region. The F-35 functions not only as a weapon system, but as a platform through which the USA control and bind their allies. Whoever buys an F-35 submits to an exclusive club with strict rules and becomes technologically, militarily and politically dependent on American manufacturer Lockheed Martin and the US government.

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Detailed Summary

The Symbolic Moment: F-35 for Israel

In December 2016, two new F-35 fighter jets from the USA land at the Israeli military airbase Nevatim. Israel becomes the first country to receive this state-of-the-art jet from American manufacturer. Prime Minister Netanyahu emphasizes at the ceremony Israel's military superiority in the region. Over the following nine years, Israel receives nearly 40 such aircraft, which have proven themselves in the "Twelve-Day War" against Iran and in operations in Gaza.

The Shockwave: Saudi Arabia Receives F-35 Commitment

In November 2024, Donald Trump announces that Saudi Arabia will also receive F-35 jets. This announcement triggers massive concerns in Israel and questions the previous Israeli monopoly on this state-of-the-art system. Geopolitical expert Heiko Borchert explains that this is far more than a simple business transaction.

The F-35 as Platform and Control Instrument

Borchert describes the F-35 not primarily as a fighter aircraft, but as a platform that opens up new capability dimensions:

• Sensors and reconnaissance: The jet combines various sensors (radar, electro-optical systems) that provide unprecedented strategic depth
• Network node: The aircraft functions as a central data processor that receives and processes information from other systems
• Exclusive ecosystem: Like Facebook, Google or Amazon, a network effect emerges in which the value for each user increases with the number of other users

The F-35 Club: Rules, Dependencies, Control

Countries that buy an F-35 are admitted to an exclusive club. This club follows strict rules:

Who belongs to the club?

• Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea
• European partners: Norway, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, Italy

How does control work?

An F-35 customer is not dependent "for better or worse" because the USA has a mysterious "kill switch." Rather, manufacturer Lockheed Martin – under American government oversight – controls the entire lifecycle:

• Software upgrades and system modernizations can be refused
• Access to critical databases (such as for electronic warfare) is controlled
• Modules and functionalities can be withdrawn
• Technology transfer can be limited or prohibited

This is comparable to digital products: A country can own its F-35, but may only use it as the USA permits.

The Fields of Tension Around Saudi Arabia

1. Independence aspirations: Mohammed bin Salman announced in his "Vision 2030" that Saudi Arabia wants to spend 50 percent of its defense spending locally. An F-35 purchase could contradict this goal.

2. Israeli superiority: Would Saudi Arabia receive the same F-35 with the same technical performance as Israel? The USA must decide whether to preserve Israel's advantage.

3. Diversification of partnerships: Saudi Arabia seeks to cooperate also with Japan, South Korea, Russia and China. This contradicts the club logic of the USA.

Arms Purchases as Political Instrument

Borchert emphasizes that arms purchases go far beyond technical and economic aspects. An arms purchase has four dimensions:

1. Technological superiority: The system must be superior to the opponent
2. Closing military capability gaps: The purchase should compensate for strategic deficits
3. Economic effects: Jobs, expertise, industrial development in the manufacturer's country
4. Political dimension: The purchase binds the buyer to the seller for 20-40 years and signals geopolitical orientation

The Example of Australia and Submarine Procurement

Borchert illustrates the political dimension with the Australian submarine deal: Australia initially decided on French conventional submarines. After the change of government to Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Australia surprisingly announced it would instead build nuclear submarines with the USA and Great Britain (AUKUS Alliance). This was not a technical, but a political decision – a recalibration of geopolitical alliance.

Other Arms Clubs: Russia and China

Russia and China pursue similar strategies but have less developed alliance systems:

• Russia's key markets: China (increasingly ambivalent), India, Algeria, Vietnam
• Displacement competition: The USA attempts to make arms deals in these markets to limit Russian and Chinese influence

Does Complexity Make the World Safer?

Vogel asks whether the complexity of arms deals makes the world safer. Borchert answers in a differentiated manner:

• Complexity can slow decision-making and thus inhibit escalation
• An F-35 may be a prestige object that is never actually deployed (similar to a nuclear weapon)
• But: The decisive question is not the weapon system itself, but the political decision whether a country wants to resolve conflicts with military force
• Deterrence only works if the other side interprets the signal correctly

The mere presence of a weapon system does not automatically lead to war – the political intention of the state is decisive.

Key Statements

• The F-35 is a platform monopoly instrument of the USA, similar to digital platforms (Facebook, Google, Amazon)

• Countries that buy an F-35 submit not only technologically, but also politically to an American-dominated alliance for decades

• The planned delivery to Saudi Arabia threatens Israel's military monopoly in the region and reveals geopolitical tensions between American partners

• Arms purchases are primarily political decisions, not technical or economic transactions

• The USA cannot control countries through a "kill switch," but rather through control of software upgrades, databases and access to new functionalities

• Russia and China pursue similar strategies but often fail due to less developed alliance systems

• The decisive question is not whether weapons are present, but whether states politically decide to use military force to resolve conflicts

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