Summary

Emeritus law professor René Rhinow argues in a guest commentary in the NZZ that Switzerland is losing credibility with Western security partners due to its rigid "perpetual" neutrality. The recent rejection of overflight rights for the USA and arms exports exemplifies how the country is maneuvering itself into a security policy dead end. Rhinow calls for a shift to situational neutrality, which would be flexibly aligned with foreign, economic, and security policy objectives—without EU or NATO membership. The current rigid interpretation of the Hague Convention of 1910 dominates foreign policy debate and obscures pragmatic security considerations.

People

Topics

  • Swiss neutrality policy
  • Security policy cooperation
  • International law and neutrality law
  • NATO and EU relations
  • Arms exports

Clarus Lead

The debate over Swiss neutrality is intensifying in a geopolitical environment of growing insecurity and military conflicts at Europe's borders. Rhinow's criticism hits a sensitive point: While the Federal Council promotes cooperation with NATO and the EU, this is effectively hindered by a narrowly interpreted neutrality obligation. The central strategic question—what Switzerland needs in terms of security policy—is overshadowed by the legal question of what the Hague Convention permits. This threatens not only Western alignment but could prove paralysing in future security crises.

Detailed Summary

Rhinow historicizes the concept of "perpetual" neutrality as a global anomaly without parallel in modern international law and state practice. Most states understand neutrality as situational, non-binding non-participation in interstate wars. The Swiss variant emerged in the 19th century from concrete interests: the surrounding great powers Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France wanted assurance that Switzerland would not be a strategic burden in European wars. This historical function has become obsolete technologically, militarily, and geopolitically, but is "thoughtlessly perpetuated."

Rhinow critically analyzes the legal "ossification" of neutrality since accession to the 5th Hague Convention in 1910. Since then, the international law perspective has dominated: the central question is no longer what Swiss security requires, but what the Hague Convention permits. Former Federal Chancellor Thurnherr observed that the Federal Council treats foreign policy debate as a legal discipline, thereby excluding foreign policy dimensions. Switzerland goes beyond international legal obligations with its extensive, self-imposed neutrality policy (dual-use goods bans, refusal to admit wounded Ukrainian soldiers)—an approach Rhinow characterizes as submission to a "substantively outdated" international agreement.

Rhinow contrasts this with the far-sighted constitutional founders of 1848, who deliberately did not incorporate a neutrality obligation into the Federal Constitution to preserve future freedom of action. The paradoxical situation: the Federal Council around 1900 did not want neutrality obligations to be anchored in international law because this restricted freedom of action—precisely what is happening today. Historical experience shows: warring states (Rhinow cites Hitler's 1940 invasion of neutral Belgium and the Netherlands) considered neutrality primarily according to geostrategic utility, not according to historical neutrality fidelity.

Core Arguments

  • "Perpetual" neutrality is anachronistic in international law and politics; Rhinow calls for a shift to situational neutrality with strategic flexibility
  • Legal over-interpretation of the 1910 Hague Convention dominates Federal Council policy and blocks necessary security policy cooperation with the West
  • Historically, neutrality fulfilled a concrete function (protection from European great powers); this function no longer exists
  • Swiss neutrality policy erodes credibility with Western partners, on whose cooperation the country depends

Critical Questions

  1. Evidence: Rhinow claims Switzerland has "already lost its military protective function today"—what specific threat scenarios or deterrence models does this thesis rest upon?

  2. Counter-hypotheses: Daniel Stalder's commentary partly refutes the thesis: Could neutrality not be essential precisely as diplomatic capital toward the Global South (Russia, China) for Swiss autonomy?

  3. Causality: Rhinow links "perpetual" neutrality to loss of credibility with Western partners—is this causal relationship demonstrable, or are there confounding variables (e.g., Western economic interests)?

  4. Conflicts of Interest: Who benefits from more flexible neutrality—defense industry, NATO memberships, economic Western alignment? To what extent does this shape Rhinow's analysis?

  5. Feasibility: How could "situational" neutrality be operationalized in practice without falling into "arbitrariness and unpredictability" (as Stalder warns)?

  6. Historical Validity: Is Rhinow's reference to 1848 constitutional founders and 1940 Hitler invasion still applicable to the current multipolar context (2026)?

Bibliography

Primary Source: René Rhinow: Neutrality as a Stumbling Block in Security Policy – Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 06.04.2026 https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/neutralitaet-als-stolperstein-in-der-sicherheitspolitik-ld.1931619

Complementary Contexts (mentioned in article):

  1. 5th Hague Convention (1910) on Neutrality
  2. Federal Constitution 1848
  3. Geneva Conventions (Henry Dunant)
  4. Discourse on US overflight rights and arms exports (2026)

Verification Status: ✓ 06.04.2026

This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-check: 06.04.2026