Executive Summary
Swiss law enforcement authorities and the Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) ordered approximately 40 percent more surveillance measures through the Postal and Telecommunications Traffic Monitoring Service (ÜPF) in 2025 than in 2024. The increase is primarily attributable to cell site searches, which rose by 69 percent (19,091 cells compared to 11,290 in the previous year). Growth in other measures slowed: real-time monitoring increased by 3 percent, retrospective monitoring by 6 percent. Information requests increased by 32 percent. The NDB ordered 334 surveillance measures (2024: 106) and submitted 39,130 information requests (2024: 12,789).
Persons
- Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) (Federal Institution)
Topics
- Postal and Telecommunications Traffic Monitoring
- Law Enforcement
- Data Protection and Security
- Federal Statistics
Clarus Lead
The figures reveal a shift in surveillance priorities: while classical real-time monitoring stagnates, area-wide monitoring through cell site searches is expanding massively. This suggests a strategy to identify suspicious persons across large areas using location data, rather than targeted monitoring of individual communications. In parallel, the NDB tripled its activities – a signal of increased security concerns at the national level. The new financing rules since 2024, in which cantons participate with fixed contributions, may have enabled this increase.
Detailed Summary
The surveillance statistics differentiate between several types of measures with different growth dynamics. Real-time monitoring (simultaneous listening to phone calls or reading emails) reached 1,878 cases (+3 percent). Retrospective monitoring – data queries about communication partners and times for up to six months back – increased to 6,531 (+6 percent). Emergency searches to locate missing persons rose to 1,287 (+5 percent), while manhunts for convicted persons fell to 17 (−51 percent).
Growth is concentrated on cell site searches: These retrospectively capture all communications at specific mobile phone cells within a time window – an instrument for identifying persons at crime scenes. With 54 cases (2024: 44) and 19,091 affected cells, the statistics document a shift toward area-wide surveillance methods.
For information requests (data queries without active monitoring), the ÜPF recorded an increase of 32 percent. Complex information requests – such as contract or ID copies – rose by 39 percent to 44,836 requests. Simple information requests (phone directory and IP queries) reached 650,034 disclosures (+31 percent).
The offense distribution shows: 45 percent of all measures concerned property crimes (+45 percent), 24 percent crimes against life and bodily integrity (+75 percent), 8 percent drug offenses (+10 percent). Offenses against sexual integrity doubled (+124 percent), while measures against public peace declined (−28 percent).
The NDB ordered 334 surveillance measures – an increase of 215 percent compared to 106 in the previous year. Its 39,130 information requests (+206 percent) demonstrate intensified intelligence activities. Specialized tools such as GovWare (government trojans) were used only 4 times (2024: 12 times), while IMSI-Catchers (cell site simulators) were used 151 times – primarily in emergency searches (62 cases) and drug offenses (45 cases).
Key Findings
- 40-percent increase in surveillance measures, primarily driven by cell site searches (+69 %)
- Classical monitoring stagnates: Real-time monitoring only +3 %, retrospective monitoring +6 %
- NDB triples activities: 334 surveillance measures (+215 %) and 39,130 information requests (+206 %)
- Property crimes dominate (45 % of all measures), violent crimes rise sharply (+75 %)
- Financing reform 2024 (fixed canton contributions) may have enabled capacity expansion
Critical Questions
Data Quality: The statistics record surveillance orders per telecommunications provider, not affected individuals. How many individuals are actually monitored if the same phone number is queried from multiple providers? Are double counts excluded?
Methodological Break: The counting method for cell site searches changed in 2024 (from "per cell per 2 hours" to "per order per 2 hours"). Is the 69-percent increase partly a statistical artifact of this change?
Approval Practice: The text names formal approval steps (judges, Federal Administrative Court, VBS, EDA, EJPD), but does not document how many requests were rejected. How strict is substantive review?
Offense Distribution: Property crimes rise by 45 percent, sexual integrity by 124 percent. Does this reflect genuine crime trends or changed investigation priorities? Are comparative data on the frequency of these offenses available?
NDB Explosion: The NDB increase of 215 percent is dramatic. What specific security situations or threat scenarios justify this increase? Are external factors documented?
Financing Incentives: Since 2024, cantons pay fixed amounts instead of per-measure fees. Does this model create incentives to order more surveillance because marginal costs decrease?
GovWare Decline: Government trojans were used only 4 times in 2025 (vs. 12 times in 2024). Is this due to technical reasons, stricter legal restrictions, or does it reflect effectiveness problems?
Transparency Gap: The ÜPF service "has no knowledge of the content of the data." How is abuse by law enforcement authorities controlled if the central service is blind?
Bibliography
Primary Source: Monitoring of Postal and Telecommunications Traffic 2025 – Statistics of Law Enforcement Authorities and the Federal Intelligence Service – https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/In7wcvFLifhBDFtjfsjMq
Supplementary Legal Sources:
- Criminal Procedure Code (StPO; SR 312.0)
- Federal Intelligence Service Act (NDG; SR 121)
- Ordinance on the Financing of Postal and Telecommunications Traffic Monitoring (FV-ÜPF; SR 780.115.1)
Verification Status: ✓ 28.04.2026
This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial Responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-Check: 28.04.2026