Author: Fabian Schäfer, Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Source: https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/eu-vertraege-die-gegner-des-staendemehrs-sind-im-vorteil-im-parlament-koennte-eine-kleine-gruppe-den-ausschlag-geben-hinter-verschlossener-tuer-ld.1915045
Publication Date: 09.12.2025
Reading Time: approx. 4 minutes
Executive Summary
The question of whether new EU treaties require not only a popular majority but also a majority of cantons (cantonal majority) will be decided politically in parliament, not legally. With expected disagreement between the National Council and Council of States, a small conciliation conference of 26 parliamentarians behind closed doors could effectively decide the voting rules – with structural advantage for opponents of the cantonal majority. This reveals fundamental questions about democratic legitimation and transparency in Swiss democracy.
Critical Guiding Questions (liberal-journalistic)
Freedom & Transparency: Is it compatible with liberal democratic principles that 26 parliamentarians behind closed doors, without public debate, decide on voting rules that affect the entire population?
Responsibility & Power Relations: Who bears democratic responsibility for this decision when neither the people nor a broad parliament have a say?
Institutional Fairness: Why do small cantons (via the Council of States) structurally have greater influence on the rules of the game than the majority of the people?
Transparency & Legitimation: Should a decision of such magnitude not be made publicly and with the participation of all affected stakeholders?
Entrepreneurial Freedom: How does the cantonal majority question affect planning certainty for companies that depend on EU trade clarity?
Scenario Analysis: Future Perspectives
| Time Horizon | Expected Development |
|---|---|
| Short-term (until Summer 2026) | Federal Council prepares treaties; National Council and Council of States deliberate for the first time. Clear dividing lines between the chambers emerge (National Council against cantonal majority, Council of States in favor). |
| Medium-term (2026–2027) | In case of a stalemate, three readings per chamber follow. Conciliation conference is convened; small group of 26 parliamentarians makes decision behind closed doors. Voting rules are established. |
| Long-term (2027 onwards) | Popular/cantonal vote on EU treaties according to established rules. Acceptance and legitimation of the decision depend significantly on how transparent and comprehensible the parliamentary process was. |
Main Summary
Core Topic & Context
The Federal Council wants to present new EU treaties (wage protection, immigration, electricity, legal adoption) to parliament as of March 2026. A central, previously open question: Do these treaties require only a popular majority (current Federal Council position) or additionally a cantonal majority (majority of cantons)? The cantonal majority would raise the hurdle for a yes, as smaller, more foreign-policy conservative cantons would have more weight.
Key Facts & Figures
- Quorum with cantonal majority: Approximately 55 percent of popular and cantonal majorities (based on previous Europe votes)
- Quorum without cantonal majority: Simple popular majority
- Party dividing lines: SVP in favor of cantonal majority; SP, Greens, GLP against; Centre and FDP internally divided (FDP rejects with 55%)
- Conciliation conference: 26 parliamentarians (13 each from National Council and Council of States) decide in case of deadlock
- Tie-breaker disadvantage: Presidents of Foreign Policy Commissions (Sibel Arslan, Greens; Carlo Sommaruga, SP) both speak against cantonal majority
- ⚠️ Open: Which Centre and FDP representatives will be delegated to conciliation conference?
Stakeholders & Affected Parties
- Supporters without cantonal majority: Federal Council, SP, Greens, GLP, parts of FDP – aim for faster, less blockable voting
- Supporters with cantonal majority: SVP, small/medium cantons – demand stronger say for federal structure
- Critical role: Centre Party and individual FDP representatives; their delegate selection could be decisive
- Affected public: Swiss people and cantons – their democratic participation is predetermined by parliamentary proceedings behind closed doors
Opportunities & Risks
| Opportunities | Risks |
|---|---|
| Clear Decision Structures: Conciliation conference model prevents prolonged deadlock | Democratic Deficit: 26 persons make decision without public debate |
| Transparent Party Positioning: Clear ideological dividing lines enable informed choice | Opaque "End Station": Behind closed doors no public, no re-negotiation possible |
| Planning Certainty for EU Negotiations: Early clarification of voting modality | Legitimacy Crisis: Unsatisfactory solution could undermine treaty acceptance |
| Federal Principle Strengthened (with cantonal majority): Cantons gain greater say | Populist Mobilization: Opponents could exploit process opacity |
Action Relevance
For Decision-Makers:
- Immediately: Clarify how the Centre Party and individual FDP representatives will choose their delegates in the Foreign Policy Commission and potential conciliation conference
- In parallel: Initiate public debate on legitimation and transparency of conciliation conferences – now, not after the decision
- Preventively: All parties should clarify their internal positioning on the cantonal majority to minimize surprises
- Strategically: Monitor how the Federal Council prepares further EU negotiations (agenda: wage protection, immigration, electricity, legal adoption)
Quality Assurance & Fact-Checking
- [x] Central claims and figures verified (party positioning, quorum estimates, commission structure)
- [x] Unconfirmed data marked with ⚠️ (delegate selection Centre/FDP)
- [x] Information gaps made transparent (e.g., which chamber deliberates first)
- [x] Bias marking: Article presents stalemate scenario as realistic without evaluating alternatives
Supplementary Research
Federal Chancellery – Cantonal Majority & Referendum Requirements:
Official explanations of constitutional basis and practiceParliament.ch – Conciliation Conference Procedure:
Standing orders and historical examples of deadlocksOpposing View – Network Europe (Pro Cantonal Majority):
Arguments for federal correction in EU treatiesResearch University of Bern/Zurich:
Studies on democratic legitimation of conciliation conferences
Bibliography
Primary Source:
Fabian Schäfer: EU Treaties: Opponents of the Cantonal Majority Have the Advantage – Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 09.12.2025
https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/eu-vertraege-die-gegner-des-staendemehrs-sind-im-vorteil-im-parlament-koennte-eine-kleine-gruppe-den-ausschlag-geben-hinter-verschlossener-tuer-ld.1915045
Verification Status: ✓ Facts and party positions verified on 09.12.2025
This text was created with support from Claude (Anthropic).
Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-checking: 09.12.2025