Ten Years of "Vise" – and Parmelin Sits at the Presidential Table Today
On February 26, 2016 – exactly ten years ago today – the NZZ published the commentary "Parmelin in the Vise." It described a new defense minister who wanted to take action. Ten years later, Guy Parmelin is Federal President for the second time. Today he heads the Economics Department, no longer the DDPS. But the army he was supposed to reform in 2016 is deeper in crisis than it was then. This raises uncomfortable questions – including for Parmelin himself.
What the NZZ Wrote in 2016 – and What Holds True
René Zeller diagnosed precisely in February 2016: Parmelin was caught in a vise between bourgeois traditionalists demanding five billion per year and a left wing that wanted to torpedo every new fighter jet initiative after the Gripen rejection. The commentator defended the WEA army reform as an "honest solution" – fewer personnel, but better equipped – and warned that ground forces without operational air power were of little use in security policy terms.
Ten years later, one must say: The diagnosis was correct. The WEA did get through – but the problems Zeller identified have not been solved. They have intensified. The vise has tightened. And the question that no one asked so directly in 2016 is pressing today: Did the political class – and did Guy Parmelin as defense minister during the crucial years – do enough?
Parmelin's DDPS Record: Taking Action, Stumbling, Passing On
Guy Parmelin headed the DDPS from January 2016 to December 2018. Three years that should have served as a course correction. What actually happened?
Positively noted was that Parmelin got the WEA through Parliament – after tough struggles, during which the SVP had temporarily torpedoed its own reform because the budget was too low. Parmelin prevailed against his own party. He suspended the failed Bodluv project, which had reached a dead end under Army Chief Blattmann, and parted ways with Blattmann – a step initially credited to him as decisive action.
But the critical assessment weighs heavier. Parmelin left the DDPS without having solved the major outstanding construction sites:
- The fighter jet succession was initiated but not decided. Parmelin launched the 2017 report "Air Defense of the Future," which still serves as a basis today – but the actual type selection and the fateful fixed-price illusion for the F-35 fell during the time of his successor Viola Amherd.
- The Bodluv project (ground-based air defense) was suspended and restarted – de facto, Switzerland lost years in renewing its air defense. A capability gap that still exists in 2026.
- Cyber defense was, according to Parmelin's own assessment, in a desolate state when he took office. He did launch the creation of positions, but the fundamental structural problems – the RUAG hack, the lack of coordination – remained systemically unsolved.
- The personnel problem – early departures toward civilian service – was already emerging but was not prioritized.
In January 2019, Parmelin switched to the Economics Department. One cannot blame him for not refusing the departmental rotation – this is customary in the Swiss system. But one may ask: Did he leave the DDPS in better condition than he found it? The answer is at best: partially. Realistically viewed: He left behind an agenda full of unfinished dossiers.
Where the Army Stands Today: Six Construction Sites Simultaneously
What was described as a political vise in 2016 is an operational crisis bundle in 2026. The problems are no longer just political – they affect material, personnel, air, ammunition, and cyber simultaneously.
1. Material: Less Training Because Less Works
The army has had to reduce the material supply for training services by 20 percent – affecting Piranha, armored personnel carriers, tanks, vehicles. The reason: obsolete systems, quality problems with new goods, spare parts shortage, skilled labor shortage in maintenance. Those who train less are less ready. So simple – and so dangerous.
2. F-35: The Fixed-Price Fairy Tale Has Burst
The USA has made clear that there is no fixed price for Switzerland – additional costs of 650 million to 1.3 billion francs are at stake. The Federal Council decided in December 2025 to stay within the popular framework of 6 billion – and to buy fewer than the planned 36 jets. Depending on the calculation, it's still 24 to 30 machines.
At the same time, the EFK finds that infrastructure at military airfields is delayed and more expensive than planned. Costs rose from 120 to 200 million francs. Militarily, Switzerland would need 55 to 70 fighter aircraft according to experts to meet the current threat scenario. Probably not even half will be delivered.
One must be honest here: The fixed-price illusion was not created under Parmelin, but under Amherd. But Parmelin, as DDPS chief, initiated the evaluation process and was responsible for the report "Air Defense of the Future." The foundations on which later planning was too optimistic stem from his time.
3. Patriot: Delivery Delays from the USA
The ground-based air defense of greater range (Patriot) is delayed because the USA prioritizes systems for Ukraine support. Exact delivery dates and impacts are partially unclear. Precisely for the capability Zeller described as crucial in 2016 – air defense – Switzerland is dependent on international supply chains and geopolitical prioritizations without being able to influence them.
4. Personnel: The Silent Erosion Process
The army counts around 146,700 assigned personnel, but the effective strength threatens to sink to 125,000 by 2029. Over 11,000 members leave the army prematurely each year – more than half toward civilian service. Of the 30-year-olds from a recruitment cohort, only 35 percent still perform military service. Refresher courses can no longer be reliably staffed.
The WEA – Parmelin's reform – relied on smaller but better-trained forces. This concept only works if the people are actually there. Precisely this is increasingly not guaranteed.
5. Ammunition: It's Missing – But Nobody Wants to Pay
In Parliament, what insiders had long known became public: ammunition stocks are insufficient. Large resupply packages fail due to budget and prioritization questions. The parallel to 2016 is striking: security policy urgency against financial policy brake logic.
6. Cyber, Sensors, Networking: Capability Gaps Everywhere
The Army Message identifies deficits in command and networking, in communications, in sensors, in ground and air effects, and in cyber and electromagnetic space. The Skyview system for air situation display, initiated under Parmelin, has proven far more complex than assumed – costs exploded, the project was temporarily frozen.
The Uncomfortable Question: Who Bears Responsibility?
In Swiss politics, responsibility is a fleeting concept. Every four years, department heads change, each inherits the problems of the predecessor and leaves their own to the successor. That's the system. But it's also the most convenient of all excuses.
Guy Parmelin was defense minister for three years. In these three years:
- the WEA was brought through Parliament (his achievement),
- the fighter jet evaluation was initiated (his decision),
- the Bodluv renewal remained in the waiting loop (his omission),
- cyber defense was initiated but not structurally anchored,
- the personnel problem was not addressed.
Afterward, he switched to the EAER and could – as usual in the collegial system – continue to have a say in DDPS matters in the Federal Council. The question is not whether Parmelin is solely to blame. That would be unfair. The question is: Did he use his three years to prepare the army for the challenges that were foreseeable?
War in Europe was not yet reality in 2016. But the Crimea annexation was two years past. The hybrid threat – cyber, disinformation, sabotage – was no secret in professional circles. The procurement problems with major systems were known after the Gripen debacle. And that personnel flight toward civilian service would increase was predictable.
Parmelin took action where it was tactically necessary. But he did not initiate the strategic reorientation that would have been needed.
The Democracy Problem: Too Slow for a Faster World
At least as serious as individual responsibility is a structural problem that has run through Swiss security policy for decades and is intensifying: Direct democracy is not built for rapid security policy adjustments.
This shows at every point:
Procurement cycles vs. threat dynamics. From the basic decision to the commissioning of a weapons system takes 10 to 15 years in Switzerland – including evaluation, type decision, referendum, parliamentary credit, procurement, infrastructure, training. During this time, the threat situation changes fundamentally. The 2017 report "Air Defense of the Future" still applies in principle according to the DDPS. But the world of 2017 is not that of 2026. Drones, ballistic missiles, electronic warfare – all of this has gained importance faster than procurement cycles can reflect.
Referendum as veto weapon. Every major procurement can fail at the ballot box – like the Gripen in 2014. This is democratically legitimate. But it creates a culture of caution that leads to unpopular but security policy necessary decisions being postponed. After the Gripen rejection, six years passed until the next fighter jet vote.
Collegial system as dilution principle. In the Federal Council, the collegium decides – not the specialist minister alone. This leads to security policy investments always being weighed against education, social affairs, infrastructure, and fiscal policy. The finance director brakes, the economics minister wants to avoid debt, the foreign minister warns of the signal effect. The result: compromises that fully satisfy no one. The army doesn't get enough to rearm. Critics claim it gets too much.
Federalism and concordance as speed brake. From consultation through parliamentary deliberation to final vote, proposals take years. The reform of the conscription system – recognized as urgent since at least 2021 – is still in the political pipeline in 2026. The "security service obligation" will be operational at the earliest by the end of the decade. Until then, the force continues to decline.
One must say it: The Swiss system systematically produces too little, too late on security policy issues. Not because the actors are incapable, but because the system is optimized for balance, compromise, and slowness – qualities that are assets in many policy areas. In security policy, where the environment can change in months, they become a risk.
The Irony of the Anniversary
On February 26, 2026, Guy Parmelin is Federal President. He has left the DDPS vise behind and is now negotiating tariff dossiers with Washington. His DDPS time is almost forgotten.
But the army whose reform he pushed through and whose future he co-responsible for is worse off than when he took office: less material in training, too little ammunition, a fighter jet procurement that becomes more expensive and delivers less, personnel on a downward trajectory, and capability gaps in cyber and networking.
The 2016 NZZ commentary was not a snapshot. It was an early warning. The vise that René Zeller described has not been released. It has merely shifted – from a political dilemma to an operational crisis.
The question to Switzerland is no longer: "Reform with capped budget or more money with political price?" It reads: Can a system built for slowness react quickly enough when the threat does not adhere to the Swiss legislative rhythm?
Ten years after "Parmelin in the Vise," no one knows the answer. But the question becomes more urgent with each month in which the gaps grow and the political mills grind at normal speed.
Sources: NZZ 26.2.2016, DDPS press releases 2025/2026, SRF, Army Message, Army Census 2025, EFK reports, FuW, swissinfo.ch