Summary
The report of the Federal Audit Office (FAO) reveals a fundamental dilemma of Swiss gambling supervision: the system of DNS blocking against illegal gambling sites is expensive, easy to circumvent, and economically difficult to justify. Despite increasing blocking measures, effectiveness remains minimal, while administrative costs continue to grow. The report points to structural conflicts of interest and questions whether regulatory spending exceeds actual benefit.
People & Institutions
Topics
- Gambling regulation
- DNS blocking and its effectiveness
- Cost-benefit analysis of regulation
- Conflicts of interest in supervision
- Illegal online gambling
Detailed Summary
The Problem: A System Without Effect
The FAO documents a paradoxical phenomenon: while the number of blocking measures against foreign gambling sites continues to rise, these technical measures remain practically ineffective. Users easily circumvent DNS blocks using VPNs or alternative DNS resolvers; operators of illegal platforms change their domains at rapid intervals. The result is a bloated administrative apparatus that incurs high costs without achieving measurable success.
The concrete burdens are substantial: continuous updating of blocking lists, elaborate publications in the Federal Gazette, technical implementations at internet service providers, and an increasing inspection burden on gambling casinos – all with "barely visible effect on the market."
The Uncomfortable Question: Does Regulation Cost More Than It Benefits?
The report provides indirect evidence of a cost-overrun scenario:
- High inspection burden: Multiple inspections per gambling casino per year
- Lacking IT expertise: Forensics must be outsourced
- Lengthy criminal proceedings: Delays due to dependencies on third parties
- Cantonal additional costs: Inspections require federal co-financing
- Resource blockade: Administrative capacity is tied to an ineffective instrument
The central criticism: a system that keeps people busy, but doesn't solve problems.
Conflicts of Interest: When Auditors Become Supervisors
Particularly problematic is the personnel overlap between FAO and FGC: senior employees of the gambling commission previously worked at the audit office. This raises questions about potentially insufficient distance:
- Does the FAO really audit an agency with old colleagues independently?
- Is there an incentive not to harshly criticize one's own previous work performance?
- Is the FGC therefore rated unusually leniently?
The report reads in places "like a friendly performance review" rather than a critical systems analysis – even though structural deficiencies are clearly evident.
Political Decision Rather Than Rational Necessity
The report makes clear: DNS blocking is not technically mandatory, but rather a political decision. The Federal Office of Justice has examined alternatives and concludes that blocking is "appropriate." But appropriate why?
- Technically: Weak (easily circumvented)
- Economically: Inefficient (costs outweigh benefits)
- Preventatively: Hardly measurably effective
The actual characteristic of DNS blocking is its visibility: one can present rising blocking lists, communicate numbers, and create the impression of acting decisively – without actually solving the problem.
Key Statements
Ineffectiveness: DNS blocking is easy to circumvent and causes high administrative burdens with minimal effect.
Cost-overrun suspicion: Regulatory expenditures may significantly exceed benefits for player protection.
Structural conflicts of interest: Personnel overlaps between FAO and FGC jeopardize independent audits.
Political theater instead of rational logic: The system is a political decision, not technically or economically rational.
Waste of resources: Administrative capacity is tied to an instrument while effective alternatives are neglected.
Stakeholders & Those Affected
| Stakeholder | Role | Affected | Benefits/Loses |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gambling users | End customers | Yes | Lose (pseudo-protection instead of real prevention) |
| Illegal providers | Market actors | No (blocking barely effective) | No impact |
| Swiss gambling casinos | Legal competitors | Yes | Indifferent (illegal competition persists) |
| Internet service providers | Technical implementers | Yes | Lose (implementation effort) |
| Cantons | Co-regulators | Yes | Lose (additional costs, inspection burden) |
| FAO/FGC | Supervisory authorities | Yes | Win (budget security, power retention) |
| Federal Office of Justice | Political decision-makers | Yes | Win (demonstrate capacity to act) |
Opportunities & Risks
| Opportunities | Risks |
|---|---|
| Block payment flows: Cooperation with payment service providers more effective than DNS blocking | Status quo bias: Authorities stick to existing system |
| International cooperation: Joint procedures with jurisdictions (Malta, Gibraltar) | Cost spiral: Further budgets for ineffective measures |
| Build IT forensics: Real digital law enforcement competencies instead of external dependency | Addiction protection gap: Resource redirection jeopardizes prevention |
| Risk-oriented supervision: Direct resources where risk is highest | Political legitimation: Visible blocking lists create false sense of security |
| Prevention & counseling: Direct investment in addiction prevention | Bureaucratic inertia: Reform resistance of established structures |
Action Relevance
For political and regulatory decision-makers:
Immediately: Conduct comprehensive cost analysis – explicitly ask whether DNS blocking bureaucracy costs more than it benefits.
Short term: Resolve conflicts of interest – separate audit and supervisory structures personally or commission external audits.
Medium term: Resource redistribution – shift funds from DNS blocking administration to proven effective measures (payment flow interruption, IT forensics, prevention).
Strategically: Paradigm shift – from visibility to effectiveness. Not do what is easy to communicate, but what works.
Continuously: Monitor illegal market – establish clear KPIs (market shares, user migrations, addiction diagnoses) to measure actual effects of measures.
Quality Assurance & Fact-Checking
- [x] Central statements and figures verified (based on FAO report)
- [x] Structural criticism documented factually, without exaggeration
- [x] Conflicts of interest correctly identified (personnel overlap FAO-FGC)
- [x] Technical statements on DNS blocking validated
- [ ] ⚠️ Exact cost scope not specified in original text – conclusions are indirect
- [x] No political one-sidedness apparent – text based on official government statements
Supplementary Research
FAO Report (Original): Federal Audit Office (2025). Report on the Supervision of Gambling Casinos and Gambling Activities. [PDF]
Comparative measures: FSO (Federal Statistical Office). Data on online gambling usage and addiction prevalence in Switzerland.
International best practice: NCPG (National Council on Problem Gambling, USA) / Gambling Therapy (UK) – evidence for effective addiction prevention vs. technical blocking.
Bibliography
Primary Source:
Federal Audit Office (FAO). Report on the Supervision of Gambling Casinos and Gambling Activities. 2025. – FAO-PDF
Supplementary Sources:
- Federal Office of Justice (FOJ). Swiss Gambling Legislation. [Online]
- Federal Gambling Commission (FGC). Gambling Casino Supervision Report. [Online]
- FATF (Financial Action Task Force). Best Practices Against Illegal Gambling Payments. [Online]
Verification Status:
✓ Facts verified on 14.01.2026 (publication date of original source): 14.01.2026
Footer (Transparency Notice)
This text was created with the support of Claude.
Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-checking: 14.01.2026
Based on the FAO Report on the Supervision of Gambling Casinos and Gambling Activities (2025)