The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty and the New Arms Spiral: Why Switzerland Must Act

Summary

Five years after the UN Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty entered into force, the picture is contradictory: almost 100 states have signed the agreement, yet the nine nuclear powers are massively expanding their arsenals instead of disarming. Switzerland, although a co-author of the treaty, refuses to accede—a mistake given rising risks. ICAN, the campaign awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017, is now putting pressure on the Federal Government with a popular initiative. Expert Florian Ebelenkamp explains why neutrality in nuclear conflict is an illusion and how Switzerland could regain influence.

People

• Florian Ebelenkamp
• Vladimir Putin
• Donald Trump

Topics

• Nuclear weapons ban
• Nuclear disarmament
• Swiss security policy
• International diplomacy

Clarus Lead

The world is caught in a new nuclear arms spiral: Russia repeatedly threatens nuclear weapons use, the US is considering tests, China is massively expanding its arsenal. In parallel, the multilateral order on which Switzerland has built its prosperity is disintegrating. Switzerland co-authored the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty, but does not sign it—and thereby loses influence over the global security architecture that threatens it.

Clarus Analysis

• Clarus Research: The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty has won over 50 percent of all UN states in five years—a success of multilateralism that Switzerland ignores. Simultaneously, a representative survey shows over 70 percent support among the Swiss electorate for accession, across all parties.

• Assessment: The Federal Government's argument (the treaty is ineffective because nuclear powers do not participate) reflects a defensive logic that becomes self-fulfilling: if Switzerland does not accede, nuclear powers have even less incentive to do so. Other small states like Austria prove that treaty participation and NATO cooperation are compatible.

• Consequence: A Swiss accession would bring diplomatic weight to the disarmament debate and increase international pressure on nuclear weapon states. At the same time, Switzerland would actively participate in shaping the global security order—instead of merely reacting to geopolitics.

Detailed Summary

The Contradiction: Treaty Successful, Disarmament Failed

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 marked a turning point: states agreed that only five countries (USA, Russia, China, France, Great Britain) could possess nuclear weapons, but committed themselves to complete disarmament. The system held up reasonably: the number of nuclear weapons fell from over 70,000 (1968) to approximately 13,000 today—a success of international law.

But this success has become fragile. In the last five years, the trend has reversed: all nuclear weapon states are investing "absurd sums" in modernization and rearmament. China is doubling its arsenal, Russia constantly threatens use, the US under Donald Trump is even considering new tests. The logic of disarmament is dead.

The cause is the two-tier system of the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself: it legitimizes nuclear weapons as a security instrument as long as they belong to "rational" leaderships. This creates incentives for other states to also develop nuclear weapons or place themselves under a nuclear power. An arms spiral emerges from which only a radical ban can break free.

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Deterrence Through Norm

This is exactly where the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty (TPNW) comes in, which ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for in 2017. It categorically prohibits development, manufacture, storage, and use of nuclear weapons—as biological and chemical weapons are already prohibited. Almost 100 states have signed. More than half of all UN members have acceded.

This is significant in international law: the treaty creates a new international norm. It states: nuclear weapons are not legitimate, even if nuclear powers (still) possess them. Historically, this strategy works: slavery was not abolished because the largest slave holders consented, but because other states said this is a question of humanity—and prevailed.

Russia's Threats and Normalized Fear

Since invading Ukraine in 2022, Russia regularly threatens nuclear weapon use. Initially this was a scandal. Today it is routine: "on a bi-weekly basis" Russian officials make threats, media barely report on them, European states remain silent. This normalization is dangerous because it anchors nuclear weapons as a legitimate means of intimidation.

Ebelenkamp emphasizes: Russia has approximately 6,000 nuclear weapons and the delivery systems to reach any point on earth in minutes. The state is at war, the military apparatus is under tension. Miscalculations are realistic. A famous example: in 1983 a Soviet early warning system reported an incoming US missile. Officer Stanislav Petrov refused to retaliate—purely on gut feeling. "We are alive today only because this man refused his order."

Nuclear deterrence thus does not work on logic, but on luck. It is based on the assumption of rational decision-makers, flawless technology, and flawless communication. All three assumptions are wrong.

Switzerland: A Heavyweight That Disempowers Itself

Switzerland is home to UN disarmament conferences and co-authored the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. Yet it does not sign it. The Federal Government argues:

1. The treaty is ineffective because nuclear powers do not participate.
2. The security situation in Europe has deteriorated (Ukraine war).
3. Accession could block NATO cooperation.

All three arguments do not withstand scrutiny.

On (1): The treaty is not ineffective simply because nuclear powers do not accede. It sets a global norm, similar to biological and chemical weapons. If Switzerland does not accede, it itself gives the signal that the ban is optional—and thereby removes pressure from nuclear powers.

On (2): Yes, the security situation is tense. But nuclear weapons threaten Switzerland already today, whether it signs the treaty or not. Accession does not change the military reality, but gives Switzerland a voice in negotiations.

On (3): Austria proves the opposite. It has acceded to the treaty and simultaneously negotiates new partnerships with NATO. There is not a single project that fails due to TPNW accession.

A representative survey shows: over 70 percent of the Swiss electorate support accession—across all parties, including conservative circles.

Popular Initiative and Growing Pressure

In December 2025, ICAN submitted a popular initiative. In parallel, the National Council and Council of States voted for an accession postulate. Pressure on the Federal Government is growing. An accession would have several effects:

• Switzerland would become part of a club of over 100 states speaking out against nuclear weapons.
• As a diplomatic heavyweight, Switzerland would have disproportionate influence on the future disarmament architecture.
• It would signal: multilateralism is not dead, even in times of tension.
• Switzerland would actively work for its own security instead of passively waiting.

Key Messages

• Nuclear powers expand instead of disarm: Despite the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the USA, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain are massively investing in modernization. A reversal of trend since the 1990s.

• Russia's threats are being normalized: Putin's regular nuclear weapon threats are no longer scandal, but routine. This normalization is the greatest short-term risk.

• The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty works: Almost 100 states have acceded in five years—faster than with other weapons bans. It sets an international legal norm, even without nuclear powers.

• Switzerland is losing influence: By not acceding, it signals that the ban is optional. It goes with the flow instead of shaping events.

• Citizens support accession: Over 70% of Swiss want their country to accede to the treaty—across party lines.

Stakeholders & Those Affected

Opportunities & Risks

Action Relevance

For Swiss Decision-makers:

1. Make a decision: Accede to the TPNW or continue defensive approach? The popular initiative forces a vote. A proactive Federal Government decision would be diplomatically smarter.

2. Clarify NATO compatibility: Bilaterally with Austria, Finland, and other TPNW members clarify: how does this work in practice? The material is available.

3. Update threat analysis: The new Federal Security Policy Strategy recognizes nuclear weapons as a threat. Logically, this must result in: active, not passive participation in solution debates.

4. Resist normalization: Speak out more clearly internationally and in media against the normalization of nuclear threats. Russia's threats are violations of international law (according to TPNW)—Switzerland could have named that.

Indicators to Monitor:

• Number of new TPNW accessions per year (currently: ~10–15)
• Russian nuclear threats (frequency and escalation)
• Parliamentary initiatives on Swiss position
• Voting results of the popular initiative (if Federal Government does not act)
• US stance under Trump on disarmament and tests

Quality Assurance & Fact-Check

• [x] Central statements and figures verified: 13,000 nuclear weapons (estimated), 70,000 in 1968, ~6,000 in