Executive Summary
Federal Councillor Martin Pfister, Head of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS), emphasizes in his speech at the Epiphany gathering of the Association of Swiss Media Publishers the central role of free and quality-focused media for national security. In the face of increasing hybrid threats, particularly from disinformation and influence activities from domestic and foreign sources, media are not only the fourth estate of a democracy, but an indispensable part of the security architecture. The Federal Council announces several measures to strengthen media diversity and resilience, including a new ancillary copyright and improved support for independent media.
Persons
- Martin Pfister – Federal Councillor and DDPS Head
- Gössi – Mover of motion on AI regulation in media
- Schaffner – Mover of motion on media promotion
Topics
- Hybrid warfare and information warfare
- Disinformation and influence activities
- Media diversity and journalistic standards
- Cybersecurity and national resilience
- Business models of media companies
Detailed Summary
Federal Councillor Pfister opens his speech with a remembrance of the victims of the Crans-Montana tragedy and honours the responsible reporting of media in times of crisis. He makes clear that security in a democracy primarily means the protection of democratic rights, freedoms and personal integrity – not merely military dominance.
The geopolitical situation in Europe has fundamentally deteriorated. The ongoing war in Ukraine, the withdrawal of the United States from global security guarantees, and the collapse of the international legal order present Switzerland and Europe with unprecedented challenges. Europe must henceforth assume greater responsibility for its own security – an imperative that also applies to Switzerland.
A central focus lies on hybrid forms of conflict that complement classical warfare. Cyberattacks, disinformation, propaganda and economic pressure are modern instruments for destabilizing societies. Russia has intensified targeted influence activities against Switzerland since 2022: platforms such as Russia Today and Pravda disseminate 800–900 articles monthly in the Swiss information space, often to be classified as disinformation. More subtle methods employ coordinated social media networks that show no discernible connection to their originators.
A concrete example: In May 2025, pro-Russian actors spread a manipulated video from Geneva across seven platforms in all official languages, intended to portray Switzerland as chaotic and non-neutral. The video reached over 2 million views in a short time.
Artificial intelligence is accelerating these developments significantly. It enables a broad range of actors to create and disseminate credible and targeted disinformation with minimal effort. The COVID pandemic demonstrated how vulnerable polarized societies are to disinformation – disruptions whose effects persist to this day.
The Federal Council has initiated several measures:
- Establishment of the Federal Office for Cybersecurity to coordinate cybersecurity measures
- Adoption of a comprehensive Security Policy Strategy (December 2025, in consultation)
- Establishment of an Interdepartmental Working Group to combat influence activities and disinformation
However, Pfister emphasizes that the state cannot bear responsibility alone. Resilience arises through an informed, critical and vigilant population as well as through high media literacy and diversity. Quality media with high journalistic standards are essential to curbing influence activities.
Free media are not only the fourth estate of a democracy, but part of the security architecture. They provide facts, offer orientation, control power and protect the information space through research, contextualization and transparency. Media diversity – both through private offerings and through the public service mandate of SRG – is thus also a security imperative.
The Federal Council supports several measures to strengthen media:
- Ancillary copyright (Message June 2025): Large online services should compensate media companies when they use journalistic content
- Gössi motion: Better protection of intellectual property from AI misuse
- Schaffner motion: Channel-independent media promotion to support journalistic content and offering diversity
Core Messages
Media are security infrastructure: In a democracy, the quality of public discourse and the media landscape is a direct indicator of democratic security and national resilience.
Hybrid threats are real: Disinformation, propaganda and coordinated influence activities are modern instruments of warfare that divide societies and weaken internal cohesion.
Russia intensifies attacks: With hundreds of monthly articles and coordinated social media campaigns, Russia is deliberately targeting Switzerland to undermine trust in democratic institutions.
Artificial intelligence amplifies the problem: AI enables a broad range of actors to create and disseminate disinformation on a larger scale, more credibly and more targeted.
Whole-of-society approach required: State, media, business and population must jointly build resilience through media literacy, quality journalism and critical information consumption.
Media diversity is imperative: Both private media diversity and a strong SRG are necessary to reach all population groups and protect the information space.
Political support is being concretized: The Federal Council supports ancillary copyright, AI regulation and channel-independent media promotion to economically stabilize media companies.
Stakeholders & Affected Parties
| Group | Status |
|---|---|
| Media companies | Directly affected – economic pressure, but also support measures |
| Population/Society | Directly affected – target of disinformation, but also bearer of resilience |
| Democratic institutions | Directly threatened – target of influence activities |
| Online platforms (tech companies) | Affected actors – must pay ancillary copyright, regulate AI |
| State/Federal administration | Responsible – coordinates measures, creates framework conditions |
| SRG | Central role – public service mandate in all regions and languages |
Opportunities & Risks
| Opportunities | Risks |
|---|---|
| Stronger media financing through ancillary copyright | Disinformation becomes exponentially more credible and effective through AI |
| Increased media literacy of the population | Societal polarization and loss of trust in institutions |
| Improved cybersecurity through Federal Office | Russian and other state actors intensify attacks |
| Media diversity as resilience factor | Economic erosion of quality media despite measures |
| European security cooperation | Isolationism and fragmentation of Europe |
| Transparent exposure of influence activities | Subtle, hard-to-prove manipulations remain effective |
Relevance for Action
For decision-makers in politics and administration:
- Adoption and implementation of the Security Policy Strategy with concrete budgets for cybersecurity and disinformation countermeasures
- Rapid implementation of ancillary copyright and media promotion measures
- Strengthening international cooperation to counter hybrid threats
- Regular monitoring and reporting on influence activities
For media companies:
- Active participation in quality assurance and fact-checking
- Investment in media literacy initiatives for the population
- Collaboration with authorities in exposing disinformation (without jeopardizing journalistic independence)
- Diversification of business models utilizing new promotion instruments
For the population:
- Increased critical media literacy and source criticism
- Awareness of manipulation techniques and AI-generated content
- Support for quality media through subscriptions and engagement
- Participation in democratic processes to strengthen cohesion
Quality Assurance & Fact-Checking
- [x] Central statements and figures verified (speech is official Federal Council communication)
- [x] Concrete examples (Crans-Montana, May 2025 video, 800–900 articles/month) documented as speech content
- [x] Motions (Gössi, Schaffner) and Messages (ancillary copyright June 2025) confirmed as speech content
- [x] No unverified speculation added
- ⚠️ Detailed figures on influence activities sourced from Federal Council communications; independent verification recommended
Supplementary Research
Federal Office for Cybersecurity (BACS) – Official reports on cyber threats and influence activities: https://www.bacs.admin.ch/
Security Policy Strategy 2025+ – Federal Council consultation document: https://www.news.admin.ch/
International: Stanford Internet Observatory – Independent research on disinformation and state influence campaigns: https://io.stanford.edu/
Swiss Media Associations – Statements on ancillary copyright message and media promotion: https://www.svmedien.ch/
European Security Architecture – NATO reports on hybrid warfare and information warfare: https://www.nato.int/
Bibliography
Primary Source:
Speech by Federal Councillor Martin Pfister at the Epiphany gathering of the Association of Swiss Media Publishers – Zurich, January 8, 2026
Supplementary Sources:
- Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) – Official communications on cybersecurity and security policy
- Federal Office for Cybersecurity (BACS) – Reports on threats in cyberspace
- Association of Swiss Media Publishers – Statements on media promotion and ancillary copyright
Verification Status: ✓ Facts checked on January 8, 2026 (speech publication date)
Footer (Transparency Notice)
This text was created with the assistance of Claude.
Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-checking: January 8, 2026
Source: Official speech Federal Councillor Martin Pfister, DDPS