Marriage as an Economic Partnership: Conflicting Goals in Swiss Tax Reform

Summary

The upcoming vote on individual taxation in Switzerland reveals a fundamental conflict of objectives: while the reform promises to abolish the marriage penalty, it also eliminates the marriage bonus – which has a much greater impact. Empirical data suggests that marriages are typically economic partnerships in which couples pool their income and manage their finances jointly, even when proponents of individual taxation prefer this model. The reform would make marital status irrelevant for tax purposes, but creates new inequalities between couples with different income distributions.

People

• Hansueli Schöchli
• Susanne Vincenz-Stauffacher
• Kathrin Bertschy

Topics

• Marriage penalty and marriage bonus in federal taxation
• Individual taxation vs. joint taxation
• Marriage as an economic partnership
• Income pooling in households
• Work incentives and tax fairness

Detailed Summary

The planned tax reform to introduce individual taxation promises to eliminate the marriage penalty. However, this is only half the story. According to the latest federal estimates, approximately 670,000 married couples currently receive preferential treatment under federal income tax compared to cohabiting couples (by at least 10 percent), while approximately 610,000 married couples are disadvantaged. If one counts only substantial advantages or disadvantages (at least 10 percent and 500 francs per year), the number of favored married couples is more than twice as large as those disadvantaged. The reform would thus completely eliminate the marriage bonus, while the marriage penalty affects significantly fewer married couples.

With individual taxation, marital status would no longer play a tax role. However, this would create a new inequality: married couples with very unequal income shares (such as 100:0 or 80:20 percent) would be burdened significantly more by tax progression than couples with equal income distribution. This appears to violate the principle of taxation according to economic capacity.

The central question is: Is marriage typically an economic partnership or rather a union of two financially independent persons? Empirical data points to the first scenario. Approximately 73 percent of tax-liable married couples of working age are dual-income couples. A 2020 survey by Bank Cler showed that about half of surveyed persons in couple relationships have a joint account, and two-thirds of couples with children do.

An analysis from the University of Bern from 2009 based on the Swiss Household Panel suggests that a couple's total income is a more important factor in one partner's consumption than their individual income. A more recent 2025 evaluation by the Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Lucerne shows: two-thirds of married persons report that household income is split equally, and another nearly 20 percent split it partially. This is much less common among unmarried persons in couple relationships – only 18 percent pool income completely.

A 2025 European meta-analysis confirms this trend: in married couples, income pooling is the majority model; among cohabiting couples it is significantly less common. In Germany, 80–90 percent of married couples practiced income pooling compared to 50–60 percent of cohabiting couples. In Sweden it was about 70 percent (married) versus 20–30 percent (unmarried).

Another argument for the economic partnership thesis: individual taxation is supposed to create stronger work incentives. In dual-income couples, tax progression begins at zero for both partners, and secondary earners (usually women) typically respond more strongly to changes in work incentives than primary earners. This would be difficult to explain if spouses were completely financially independent.

Swiss property law also assumes that marriage is an economic partnership. Without a contrary marriage contract, the statutory regime of participation in accrued property applies: upon divorce, assets acquired during the marriage are divided equally. This principle also applies to retirement provision. Only a small minority agree to a complete separation of property.

Even proponents of individual taxation relativize this perspective. Susanne Vincenz-Stauffacher, St. Gallen National Councilor and FDP Co-President, says: "Marriage is typically closer to an economic partnership" and points to statutory spousal support obligations and representation rights. The Green Liberal Bernese Kathrin Bertschy emphasizes that cohabiting couples with children are "factually just as much economic partnerships as married couples." However, she rejects joint taxation because in a progressive tax system it dampens work incentives – a political conflict between tax fairness and work incentives.

An important limitation: the finding of economic partnership only holds as long as the marriage lasts. The divorce rate has been around 40 percent over the last ten years, with average marriage duration approximately 15–16 years. After divorce, individual taxation applies again. The Federal Court clarified in 2021 that marriage is no longer a life insurance policy. Women over 45 who were not gainfully employed during marriage can no longer generally assume that a return to work is unreasonable.

Key Statements

• Approximately 670,000 married couples are currently favored by marriage taxation, while 610,000 are disadvantaged – the reform would completely eliminate the bonus
• Empirical data shows that spouses pool their income two-thirds completely, which supports the economic partnership thesis
• Individual taxation creates new inequalities between couples with different income distributions
• Even proponents of individual taxation acknowledge that marriage is typically closer to an economic partnership
• The vote requires a political weighing of interests between tax fairness and work incentives
• After divorce, individual taxation applies again; marriage no longer provides lasting financial security

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