Author: nzz.ch

Summary

Digitalization projects by Swiss public authorities regularly fail spectacularly – not due to lack of technology, but because of systematic management errors. The Citysoftnet saga in Zurich and Bern exemplifies how heavily promoted IT megaprojects end in disaster, while politicians downplay the problems. The author identifies four central solutions: reduce complexity, shorten project duration, improve control, and create transparency.

People

  • Raphael Golta (SP city councilor Zurich, responsible for Citysoftnet)

Topics

  • Digitalization projects of public authorities
  • IT project management and governance
  • Administrative modernization
  • Cost overruns in megaprojects

Clarus Lead

The public sector awards IT projects like Citysoftnet, which after over a decade cause massive problems – deficient software, erroneous billing, unreliability. In Bern, implementation alone already cost 11 million francs in supplementary credits; Zurich is experiencing similar chaos scenarios. Similar disasters are evident at unemployment insurance funds, the military, and Zurich's senior care centers. The central error: politicians promise miracles, overload projects with special requests, and ignore warnings from experts – instead of relying on proven standard solutions and achievable goals.

Detailed Summary

The Citysoftnet saga is symptomatic of systematic failure in public IT projects. When the cities of Basel, Bern, and Zurich announced development in 2014, the initiative was regarded as a "major breakthrough" – simpler workflows, paperless processes, better data protection. After nine years of development, however, reality is diametrically opposite: employees of Switzerland's largest social welfare agency report erroneous billing, unreliability in elementary work processes, and software that "cannot handle social assistance." In Bern, where Citysoftnet was already implemented in 2023, the system caused "complete chaos" – two departments were on the brink of collapse. Cost increases have spiraled completely out of control.

The problem is not IT-specific, but rather a failure of strategic management. Similar patterns emerge in the system changeover of Swiss unemployment insurance funds, where thousands of unemployed await their benefits, in IT failures of the military (digitalization platform, airspace monitoring, military logistics), and at Zurich's senior care centers, which wrongly classified hundreds of seniors as requiring care because the software allegedly permitted no other data entry. Even the private sector is not immune – UBS stopped the monster project "Rigi" after million-franc losses.

The author identifies four central failures: (1) Excessive complexity – projects are supposed to replace legacy systems, link different platforms, and add new functions. Managers without IT knowledge create wish lists that lead to unmanageable megaprojects. (2) Excessive project duration – Citysoftnet lasted nine years; during this time, technological standards, responsibilities, and the market change. (3) Lack of control – tight monitoring by steering committees is absent; individual project phases are not reviewed, costs and supplier obligations are not consistently tracked. (4) Black-box transparency – authorities report progress with minimal transparency; regular reporting to political oversight bodies is lacking.

Key Statements

  • Too complex, too large, too opaque: The business model of government IT is not fundamentally flawed, but is sabotaged through customization and lack of control.

  • Customized systems are riskier than standard solutions: Authorities should use proven products instead of expensive proprietary developments.

  • Political cosmetics worsen the problem: Responsible parties like Social Director Golta downplay problems and appear "undeterred," even though internal reports document the opposite.

  • Four concrete solutions: (1) reduce complexity through focus on core functions and incremental steps, (2) shorten project duration, (3) tight monitoring with phase reviews, (4) regular transparent reporting to political bodies.

  • Warnings ignored, costs out of control: The pattern is consistent – experts are not heard, supplementary credits follow one another, employees suffer.

Critical Questions

  1. Evidence: What reliable data exists on error rates and downtime for Citysoftnet, and was this presented to management early on?

  2. Conflicts of Interest: To what extent has the upcoming election campaign (March 2026) influenced Social Director Golta's communication strategy regarding Citysoftnet – is he delaying public assessment of important problems?

  3. Alternatives: Did Zurich technically and legally have the option in 2025 to switch to a different software solution, or were the contractual constraints too restrictive?

  4. Causality: Are Citysoftnet's errors primarily a software defect or a consequence of insufficient organizational adaptation and training by the authority?

  5. Feasibility of Solutions: What structural and political obstacles currently prevent the implementation of tight steering committees and regular reporting?

  6. Side Effects: Could overly strict phase control and a "exercise termination" risk cause authorities to abandon any innovative IT projects altogether?

  7. Data Reliability: How reliable are anonymous employee surveys on Citysoftnet, and were rebuttals from the software vendor considered?

  8. Scalability of Standard Solutions: To what extent can unmodified standard solutions meet the specific requirements of complex Swiss social welfare systems (federal variations, cantonal differences)?

Sources

Primary Source: IT Chaos at Government Agencies: There Are No Wonder Solutions – Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Commentary by Fabian Baumgartner

Verification Status: ✓ 26.02.2026

This text was created with the assistance of an AI model. Editorial Responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-Check: 26.02.2026