Executive Summary

The Swiss Federal Council has made clear in a new report that outsourcing entire asylum procedures to third countries is not practicable. Experts identified insurmountable legal, political, and practical obstacles – no European country has successfully implemented this to date. However, experts see potential in so-called return-hubs: only the deportation execution would be outsourced, not the asylum procedure itself. The EU created legal foundations for such centers in 2025, and Switzerland will have to adopt these as part of the Schengen acquis.

Key Persons

  • Eduard Gnesa (former head of State Secretariat for Migration)
  • Mario Gattiker (former head of State Secretariat for Migration)
  • Daniel Thym (constitutional law professor, asylum law expert)

Topics

  • Asylum policy
  • Migration control
  • Return-hubs
  • EU Schengen acquis
  • Externalization models

Clarus Lead

Switzerland faces pressure to adopt a new EU returns regulation that provides for return-hubs – a topic that will soon be back on the agenda. While full externalization has failed, the Federal Council positions itself strategically open to limited pilot projects with other countries, provided legal standards are maintained. This signals a pragmatic middle ground between asylum policy pressure and human rights limits, but offers realistic prospects only for specific countries (Afghanistan, Iraq).

Detailed Summary

The Swiss expert study, led among others by two former SEM heads, compares failed externalization models: the UK under Boris Johnson failed with the Rwanda plan due to legal and political resistance; Italy-Albania shows only weak results; Denmark is making no progress. Only Australia implemented it temporarily – but under "serious human rights violations" that are not comparable with European conditions.

The central finding: third countries have little interest in accepting European asylum seekers; implementation would be demanding, complex, and expensive. Nevertheless, the idea is not entirely off the table – experts such as Daniel Thym see third-country models as a "building block" of a new European asylum strategy with deterrent effect.

The EU has therefore shifted strategy: instead of entire asylum procedures, only return procedures are now outsourced (return-hubs). Persons with low asylum prospects should already be rejected and then transferred to third centers such as Rwanda, Tunisia, Egypt, or Uzbekistan – a deterrence mechanism, as swift return looms. Legal obstacles are lower here because asylum status is already clarified. The Federal Council explicitly endorses the "creation of a common legal foundation" and sees "new room for maneuver that Switzerland should use consistently." Target group would be rejected asylum seekers from countries whose return is basically possible but practically extremely time-consuming (such as Afghanistan, Iraq). However: for countries like Eritrea that generally refuse returns, the model does not work even for return-hubs.

Key Findings

  • Complete externalization of asylum procedures is legally, politically, and practically infeasible
  • Return-hubs (outsourcing only the return process) offer limited alternatives under high legal standards
  • Switzerland will have to adopt the EU returns regulation as Schengen acquis
  • Realistic target group: rejected asylum seekers from countries with protracted return procedures
  • Deterrent effect is the core of the logic, not primarily cost savings

Critical Questions

  1. Evidence/Data Quality: Is the statement "no European country has managed it so far" based on a complete survey of all planned and piloted programs, or were ongoing attempts (e.g., Netherlands) excluded?

  2. Conflicts of Interest: To what extent could the composition of the expert group (two former SEM heads) have influenced the assessment of the externalization idea – would their current rejection be more credible if they had previously invested in it?

  3. Causality/Alternative Scenarios: What concrete evidence shows that return-hubs actually have a deterrent effect, or is this based on assumptions similar to the failed Rwanda model?

  4. Feasibility with Third-Country Refusal: If countries like Eritrea categorically refuse returns, how are return-hubs supposed to work for other countries of origin if the same state non-cooperation could apply?

  5. Human Rights Standards: What control gaps arise from transferring return procedures to third countries, and who bears responsibility for human rights violations in remote hubs?

  6. Cost-Benefit Transparency: The report mentions high costs as an obstacle – how are these balanced against the expected deterrent benefit, and are there cost estimates?

Bibliography

Primary Source: Federal Council Report and Expert Study on Asylum Procedure Externalization – NZZ Switzerland (18.04.2026) https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/bericht-des-bundesrats-zeigt-die-schweiz-koennte-sich-an-weit-entfernten-eu-return-hubs-fuer-migranten-beteiligen-ld.1933911

Supplementary Context from Article:

  1. EU Returns Regulation 2025 and Schengen acquis
  2. Rwanda model (UK under Boris Johnson)
  3. Italy-Albania agreement
  4. Denmark asylum policy
  5. Australian offshore model

Verification Status: ✓ 18.04.2026

This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial Responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-Check: 18.04.2026