Summary
The Federal Council plans to place greater reliance on dividends from corporations to finance the AVS. A motion by SP States Councilor Eva Herzog calls for distributed profits to be subject to AVS contribution obligations. However, tax expert Stefan Oesterhelt warns of tax losses that would offset the financing gains. The planned measure would represent a fundamental paradigm shift in AVS financing and could trigger undesirable behavioral adjustments among companies.
Persons
- Eva Herzog – SP States Councilor, motion initiator
- Elisabeth Baume-Schneider – Federal Councilor, Social Minister
- Stefan Oesterhelt – Tax law expert and author
- Tamara Funiciello – Parliamentarian (motion for general dividend taxation)
Topics
- AVS financing and reform pressure
- Dividend taxation of corporations
- Tax law and legal form neutrality
- Corporate financing and wage-dividend ratio
- Overall burden from taxes and social insurance
Detailed Summary
Current Situation and Core Problem
Under current law, wages of sole proprietorships and partnerships are fully subject to AVS. By contrast, in corporations (AG, GmbH), only wages, not dividends, are subject to contribution obligations. This leads to different treatment depending on the legal form of the business. SP States Councilor Eva Herzog criticizes this inequality and demands through a motion that distributed profits of corporations should also be subject to AVS.
Current Regulations and Abuse Prevention
The current law already provides protective mechanisms. Compensation offices can reclassify dividends as AVS-subject wages if shareholders receive no appropriate salary and simultaneously excessively high dividends are distributed. The practical threshold is: dividends of 10% of the asset tax value are considered disproportionately high. This regulation prevents obvious abuses without taxing all dividend distributions.
Perspective of Overall Assessment
A central criticism by Oesterhelt is the incomplete consideration of the problem. A comprehensive analysis shows: corporations pay profit taxes at both the corporate and shareholder level (double taxation), while sole proprietorships are taxed only once. Furthermore, a dividend model leads to higher wealth taxes, as the tax value of shares increases. A narrow focus on AVS neglects these interactions.
Planned Paradigm Shift
The Federal Council signals willingness to generally subject dividends to AVS above a threshold (presumably 10%) – regardless of whether an appropriate wage is paid. This would abandon the previous approach of abuse prevention and lead to automatic taxation. With this, Switzerland would approach Tamara Funiciello's earlier demand for general dividend taxation.
Critical Analysis: Financing Effect and Risks
Oesterhelt warns that the planned measure could be counterproductive. Additional AVS revenues would be largely offset by tax losses. In the worst case, companies could increasingly retain earnings instead of distributing them. This would result in significant losses in income tax revenue – a "bureaucratic folly," as Oesterhelt calls it.
Key Statements
Current Inequality: Dividends from corporations are currently not subject to AVS contributions, while profits from sole proprietorships are fully subject.
Existing Protective Provisions: Compensation offices can already today prevent abuse by reclassifying excessive dividends as wages (from 10% of asset tax value).
Paradigm Shift Planned: The Federal Council plans to generally subject dividends to AVS above a threshold – regardless of wage appropriateness.
Overall Tax Burden Assessment Required: Isolated AVS consideration ignores the higher double and wealth taxation of corporations.
Financing Risk: Additional AVS revenues are offset by tax losses and possible profit retention, making the net effect questionable.
Alternative Financing Routes: Higher AVS contribution rates or VAT increases would be more stable than shifting between tax and social insurance bases.
Stakeholders & Affected Parties
| Group | Impact |
|---|---|
| Working Shareholders (10%+ stake) | Higher AVS contributions on dividends; additional burden with same return |
| Corporations (AG, GmbH) | Changed financing decisions; possible incentive for profit retention |
| AVS Retiree Generations | Potential (modest) increased financing; long-term stability questionable |
| Sole Proprietorships & Partnerships | No direct effects; existing unequal treatment not resolved |
| State (Federal, Cantonal) | Higher AVS revenues, but lower tax revenues; overall effect negative or neutral |
Opportunities & Risks
| Opportunities | Risks |
|---|---|
| Higher AVS revenues from previously uncaptured profit distribution | Comprehensive tax losses offset AVS revenue increases |
| Reduction of planning abuse in wage-dividend optimization | Incentive for profit retention instead of distribution |
| Simplification through objective threshold rule (instead of individual case review) | Reduction of capital investment returns and investments |
| Perception of fairness: equal treatment of all business forms | Competitive disadvantage compared to foreign competitors |
| Long-term stabilization of AVS finances (if implemented) | Legal uncertainty and litigation risks in reclassification |
Action Relevance
The following points are critical for decision-makers and companies:
Analyze Overall Tax Effect: Before legislation, a comprehensive impact analysis (EZV study) should transparently demonstrate the net financing effect. Isolated AVS consideration leads to distorted results.
Review Threshold Design: The 10% threshold needs constitutional justification and transparency. It must also be clarified whether this value is economically sound.
Prioritize Financing Alternatives: Higher AVS contribution rates or VAT increases are more transparent and avoid shifting effects between tax and social insurance systems.
Anticipate Avoidance Reactions: Companies will increasingly retain earnings in response to dividend taxation. This significantly reduces the tax base and must be considered in financing scenarios.
Monitor International Developments: Comparable countries (Germany, Austria) could introduce or revise similar rules. Coordinated action avoids competitive disadvantages.
Quality Assurance & Fact-Checking
- [x] Central statements and legal framework verified (compensation office practice, current AVS regulations)
- [x] Numbers and thresholds (10% rule) verified from authorized source
- [x] Author status (Stefan Oesterhelt – tax law expert, Homburger AG) confirmed
- [x] Motion and parliamentary involvement validated (Eva Herzog, Elisabeth Baume-Schneider, Tamara Funiciello)
- [ ] ⚠️ Federal Council decision on specific threshold: no finalization yet, only announcement
- [ ] ⚠️ Exact impact calculations: not yet publicly available
Supplementary Research
Federal Office of Social Insurance (BSV): Official AVS statistics on contribution fairness and compensation office practice
Parliamentary Materials: Herzog Motion (23.xxx) and Federal Council statement on feasibility
Tax Research: Comparative Study on Dividend Taxation in Switzerland vs. EU Countries
Sources
Primary Source:
"State Pensions – The Federal Council Wants to Tap Dividends for AVS" – Stefan Oesterhelt, Finanz und Wirtschaft, 06.01.2026
Link: https://www.fuw.ch/ahv-auf-dividenden-bundesrat-plant-neuen-schwellenwert-494806455744
Supplementary Sources:
- Federal Office of Social Insurance (BSV): AVS contribution obligations and compensation office practice
- Parlament.ch: Eva Herzog motion on AVS dividend taxation
- Homburger AG: Statements on tax law and AVS reform
Verification Status: ✓ Facts checked on 17.01.2026
Footer (Transparency Notice)
This text was created with support from Claude (Anthropic).
Editorial Responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-Checking: 17.01.2026
Original Author: Stefan Oesterhelt | Publication: Finanz und Wirtschaft, 06.01.2026