Summary

The German Federal Council has called for a significant tightening of planned laws on digital criminal prosecution in its plenary session. The upper house of parliament is demanding that the federal government grant authorities more comprehensive powers for automated image comparison on the internet and AI-supported data analysis. This is to be implemented through expanded competencies of the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). The proposal responds to a February 2023 ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, which called for stricter legal requirements for such systems. The main points of contention are the coupling of criminal prosecution and hazard prevention as well as new powers to freeze traffic data.

People

Topics

  • Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO)
  • Biometric mass screening
  • AI-supported data analysis
  • Digital investigative powers
  • Data protection and surveillance

Clarus Lead

The states are pushing through against the constitutional protection hurdles that the federal government has built in. They are demanding a central service provider function of the BKA and BfV for data processing – with the consequence that digital mass surveillance in Germany would become significantly easier. While the eco Association of the Internet industry warns of a transformation of the open internet into a state identification space, the states are advancing technological freedom of action. This tension between security demands and digital surveillance will become the central political line of conflict for the coming legislative phase.

Detailed Summary

The point of dispute focuses on the draft of a new paragraph 98e of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is intended to regulate cross-procedure research and analysis platforms, to which the federal government is responding with its legislative package (Justice Minister Hubig and Interior Minister Dobrindt). However, the states believe the planned version is technically inadequate: they criticize the coupling of criminal prosecution and preventive hazard prevention as too vague. In practice, this would mean that AI analysis tools could often not be used in classical criminal proceedings – for example in cases of child abuse or organized crime – because the state-level requirements are lacking. The federal states therefore demand an independent competency for data consolidation specifically for the purpose of criminal prosecution, independent of hazard prevention criteria.

Another central concern involves the quick-freeze powers of the BKA. The Federal Council demands that the BKA issue security orders to telecommunications providers to freeze traffic data – even if the responsible state police are already aware of the matter but are themselves not yet permitted to collect data. This would establish the BKA as a central service provider for all 16 federal states and circumvents the dilemma of lacking telecommunications competency at the state level. Similarly, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) should receive the same power to preventively secure data in the event of vague indications of attack planning.

The eco Association, by contrast, warns of the consequences of biometric mass screening on the internet. Klaus Landefeld criticizes that publicly accessible content would be made automatically searchable by face – which shifts the boundary between targeted criminal prosecution and general digital surveillance. The association instead advocates for targeted, effective and controllable instruments rather than a digital surveillance architecture maintained in reserve.

Key Findings

  • The Federal Council is calling for a significant expansion of powers for automated data analysis and biometric image comparison, while the federal government has built in hurdles for constitutional reasons.
  • The BKA and BfV should function as central service providers for all states and be able to freeze traffic data to circumvent gaps in telecommunications legislation.
  • Critics such as the eco Association warn of a de facto transformation of the internet into a state surveillance space and instead call for constitutionally narrow, proportional and controllable instruments.

Critical Questions

  1. Evidence/Data Quality: On what empirical basis do the states' demands rest that state-level hazard prevention criteria should no longer be relevant in the StPO amendment? Are there evaluations of existing systems?

  2. Conflicts of Interest: What role do different security situations in the federal states play in the demand for centralized BKA and BfV powers – could this lead to concentration of power?

  3. Causality/Alternatives: Is a coupling with hazard prevention really the practical bottleneck, or are there other reasons why AI systems are not being used? Have alternatives to centralized service providers been examined?

  4. Proportionality: How is the Federal Constitutional Court ruling from February 2023 – which demanded strict legal criteria – being taken into account in a further liberalization of powers?

  5. Feasibility/Side Effects: If the BKA is allowed to preventively freeze data without the state police's final authorization already in place: How long can data remain "frozen," and who controls the search afterwards?

  6. Data Protection: The eco Association warns of the transformation of the internet into a "state search space" – how can precautions be taken against massive false positives in facial recognition?

  7. Rule of Law: If secret services (BfV) are allowed to preventively secure traffic data based on vague indications, how is the transition from prevention to arbitrary mass surveillance prevented?

Source Directory

Primary Source: Biometric Mass Screening: Federal Council Demands Even Stricter AI Surveillance – Heise Online

Supplementary Sources:

  1. Ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court from February 2023 on automated data analysis systems (cited in the article)
  2. Statement by the eco Association of the Internet industry

Verification Status: ✓ 2025

This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-checking: 2025