Executive Summary

On April 1, 2026, the Federal Council adopted its statement on parliamentary initiative UREK-N 25.482. The initiative aims to treat losses and gains from electricity procurement in basic supply symmetrically as net costs. To date, basic suppliers bear losses alone, while gains are not passed on to customers. The Electricity Supply Act (StromVG) of 2007 is to be clarified accordingly. The National Council will address this in the special session 2026, and the Council of States is expected to do so in the summer session 2026.

Persons

  • Commission for the Environment, Spatial Planning and Energy of the National Council (UREK-N) (Initiator)

Topics

  • Electricity supply and tariff design
  • Energy regulation
  • Consumer protection

Clarus Lead

The legislative change addresses a structural imbalance in the electricity market that forces basic suppliers to bear risk without benefiting from gains. Through symmetrical treatment, incentives are created for long-term, structured procurement strategies – a mechanism that directly improves tariff stability for millions of electricity customers. The rapid handling in two sessions signals high parliamentary priority for energy market stability.

Detailed Summary

The current Electricity Supply Act of March 23, 2007 regulates the permissible cost items in tariff calculations by basic suppliers. The current regulation contains asymmetrical treatment: losses from hedging transactions (for example, due to price fluctuations or volume deviations) are borne entirely by basic suppliers and passed on to tariffs. Gains from the same business activities, however, do not flow into tariff calculations and do not benefit end customers.

UREK-N argues that this asymmetry creates perverse economic incentives. Basic suppliers are penalized for losses but not rewarded for gains – a regime that makes long-term investment in structured procurement difficult. Net cost treatment (losses minus gains), by contrast, is intended to create stable incentives for professional procurement processes. The Federal Council supports this logic and expects positive effects on the investment capacity and cost-effectiveness of basic suppliers. This is intended to result in lower and less volatile electricity tariffs for end consumers.

Key Statements

  • Symmetrical treatment of losses and gains creates better incentives for structured electricity procurement
  • More stable tariffs for electricity customers in basic supply are the goal of the legislative adjustment
  • National priority: handling planned in special and summer session 2026

Critical Questions

  1. Evidence: What empirical data demonstrate that the previous asymmetrical regulation has led to more volatile tariffs or lower investment? Were comparable cases from other countries consulted?

  2. Conflicts of Interest: Which stakeholders (basic suppliers, energy companies, consumer protection organizations) have taken positions on this initiative, and how are their interests distributed?

  3. Causality: Does net cost treatment alone guarantee stable tariffs, or do wholesale prices and procurement risks play a dominant role that this regulation does not address?

  4. Implementation: How are gains and losses concretely measured and delineated? What administrative and compliance challenges arise for smaller basic suppliers?

  5. Time Frame: What time horizon is used for measuring net costs (annual basis, multi-year period)? How are transition phases regulated?

  6. Consumer Protection: What protection mechanisms prevent basic suppliers under the net cost regime from capturing gains and artificially keeping tariffs high?

Bibliography

Primary Source: Federal Council: Statement on parliamentary initiative UREK-N 25.482 – https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/N_RNY5jaX6ObQDsPCcrwI

Verification Status: ✓ 01.04.2026

This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial Responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-Check: 01.04.2026