Federal Council Approves Energy Ordinances: Efficiency Requirements and Electricity Remuneration Newly Regulated

Summary

The Federal Council approved on 27 May 2026 partial revisions of six ordinances in the energy and electricity sector. The changes regulate efficiency requirements for devices, the remuneration of electricity fed into the grid, and clarifications regarding hydropower and nuclear energy. Most revised ordinances come into force on 1 July 2026; new rules for feed-in remuneration follow on 1 January 2027. The proposal was partially adjusted following a consultation period (16 September to 22 December 2025).

Persons

• Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) (Regulatory authority; competence adjustment)
• Federal Office for the Environment (BAFU) (Enforcement authority; resource efficiency)
• Federal Office of Energy (BFE) (Information gathering; electricity market)

Topics

• Energy efficiency and device standards
• Electricity remuneration and market price regulation
• Hydropower promotion
• Nuclear energy and radioactive waste
• EU harmonization

Clarus Lead

The revision addresses two central challenges of Switzerland's energy transition: rising solar electricity production with negative market prices during peak load days and the necessity to adapt regulatory standards to EU developments. The new market price rule for electricity feed-in creates incentives for self-consumption and storage rather than grid feed-in during surpluses – a strategic signal for decentralized energy economy. Simultaneously, small-scale installations (under 150 kW) are protected through guaranteed minimum remuneration, which preserves investment security for prosumers.

Detailed Summary

The Energy Ordinance (EnEV) is being adapted to EU requirements on resource efficiency. The BAFU now receives enforcement competence for these requirements; the BFE and BAFU can query import data from the Federal Customs Administration (BAZG). A national peculiarity is being eliminated: the energy label for coffee machines, which previously deviated from EU specifications.

In the electricity market, growing solar production leads to increasingly frequent periods of negative prices. The new regulation decouples feed-in remuneration from negotiations between grid operators and producers and ties it to the market price at the time of feed-in. This is intended to create incentives for self-consumption and storage. Producers with installations under 150 kW retain their minimum remuneration; differences between reference market price and minimum remuneration are balanced quarterly by grid operators.

For hydropower promotion, two clarifications are made: The sliding market premium now takes into account the same investment costs as the promotion instrument "investment contribution". Additionally, payments to the public sector according to concession are now credited for new installations and substantial expansions – previously only for renewals.

In the nuclear energy sector, authorization competence is redistributed: Certain handling activities with weakly radioactive waste now require authorization under radiation protection legislation instead of nuclear energy law handling authorization. The ENSI retains safety responsibility.

Key Statements

• Electricity remuneration is coupled to market prices to reduce overcapacity during negative price periods
• Small-scale installations (< 150 kW) continue to receive guaranteed minimum remuneration as investment protection
• Hydropower promotion is clarified; public sector payments now apply to new installations as well
• Nuclear energy regulation is simplified through shifting weakly radioactive waste into radiation protection law
• EU harmonization advanced for device efficiency; national special regulations (coffee machine label) eliminated

Critical Questions

1. Evidence: What empirical data demonstrate that the new market price-linked remuneration actually leads to more self-consumption and storage – or is there a risk that producers simply do not feed in during negative prices without storing?

2. Conflicts of Interest: Do grid operators benefit from quarterly settlement of minimum remuneration differences, or are incentives for rapid payment sufficiently anchored?

3. Causality: Is the reduction of electricity surpluses primarily limited by price signals or by lacking storage infrastructure – does the ordinance address the core problem?

4. Feasibility: How is the technical implementation of market price coupling practiced in decentralized grids with thousands of small-scale installations, and what IT requirements arise for grid operators?

5. Side Effects: Could the market price rule for larger installations (> 150 kW) lead to investment uncertainty and hinder new hydropower or wind power construction?

6. Source Validity: Were EU harmonization requirements fully incorporated into Swiss ordinances, or do new incompatibilities arise?

7. Regulatory Coherence: How do BAFU, BFE and BAZG coordinate the new competencies in device import controls in practice?

Bibliography

Primary Source: Federal Council Approves Energy Ordinances – Efficiency Requirements and Electricity Remuneration – https://www.news.admin.ch/de/newnsb/dG_O0Uyp3C3luCjhuCUpR

Verification Status: ✓ 27.05.2026

This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial Responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-Check: 27.05.2026