Summary

In December 2025, National Councilor Gerhard Andrey (Greens) and SVP Council of States member Werner Salzmann unanimously pushed through 10 million Swiss francs in federal funds to develop an open-source alternative to Microsoft Office in the military against the resistance of Finance Minister Karin Keller-Sutter. The move responded to Army Chief Thomas Süssli's warning that Microsoft 365 poses a security risk for classified documents due to the US Cloud Act. In parallel, France decided on 8 April 2026 on a binding national migration strategy: all ministries must submit migration plans by autumn 2026 for 2.5 million civil servants, moving away from Windows and Microsoft tools towards Linux and open-source solutions. A structural contradiction remains unresolved: the Swiss Army is building its new "sovereign" digitization platform (NDP) on virtualization technology from American corporation Broadcom/VMware.

Persons

  • Gerhard Andrey (National Councilor, Greens; IT entrepreneur, advocate of digital sovereignty)
  • Werner Salzmann (SVP Council of States member; co-initiator of Microsoft replacement funds)
  • Thomas Süssli (former Army Chief; warned of Cloud Act risks)

Topics

  • Digital sovereignty and Cloud Act
  • Open-source migration in federal administration
  • Governance and enforcement capacity
  • New digitization platform (NDP) of the military
  • Switzerland–France comparison

Clarus Lead

While Switzerland is politically committed to open-source, organizational bottlenecks and strategic contradictions are emerging. The December coup by Andrey and Salzmann demonstrates parliamentary enforcement power, yet Andrey himself diagnoses a "bigger task": a complete Microsoft replacement takes years and fails due to deep dependencies in administrative infrastructure. More critically: the Army is building its critical digitization platform precisely on American virtualization technology, which undermines the sovereignty goal. France is simultaneously demonstrating a different model – not with pilot projects, but with binding deadlines, central enforcement through the digital authority DINUM, and a coordination capacity that Switzerland structurally lacks.

Detailed Summary

Andrey's success in December 2025 was based on an acute security warning from then-Army Chief Süssli. He had documented that Microsoft 365 is "largely unusable" for the military because the Cloud Act enables US authorities direct access to data – problematic for classified military documents. Andrey strategically used this "opportunity" to push through a dedicated investment that includes not only the military but also the civilian federal administration. The unanimous parliamentary vote succeeded against explicit resistance from the Finance Ministry.

In his analysis, Andrey is more sober. A partial transition would be possible within months, but a complete replacement is "a bigger task that would certainly take several years." Microsoft has deep integration points: countless specialist applications and proprietary dependencies permeate the administrative landscape. Andrey describes the path to digital sovereignty as a "generational task." At the same time, he sharply criticizes the cost-cutting policy of the Federal Council and the bourgeois majority, which cuts funding for innovation topics such as E-ID and Digisanté – a contradiction that delays and weakens programs.

As a solution model, Andrey advocates for the sociocratic consent procedure instead of classical consensus: not everyone has to agree, but there must be no justified veto. "Not having the appetite" is, for example, not a valid objection." This model worked during the E-ID referendum: the "organized Switzerland" – from business associations to civil rights organizations – jointly supported the proposal. The extra effort pays off because failed proposals cost the general public more than broad community processes.

Since 8 April 2026, France has relied on binding requirements rather than participation. The digital authority DINUM is transitioning its own workstations to Linux, requiring all ministries to submit binding migration plans by autumn 2026 – for operating systems, collaboration tools, AI systems, databases, and networks. The video conference solution Visio is already replacing Teams and Zoom in several ministries on sovereign French cloud infrastructure (ANSSI-certified). Digital Minister David Amiel states unambiguously: the goal is to "regain control over digital destiny." France also knows contradictions – the Education Ministry extended a 152-million-euro Microsoft framework contract until 2029 – but the central authority DINUM can enforce deadlines across departments.

The Swiss Army's largest digitization project, the New Digitization Platform (NDP), reveals a deeper structural problem. The NDP is scheduled to go live on 1 July 2026 and is budgeted at 477 million Swiss francs, with expansion into the 2030s. However, it is based on virtualization technology from American corporation Broadcom/VMware – precisely the provider subject to the same Cloud Act risks that Süssli warned about. Since the VMware acquisition in 2023, Broadcom has shifted licensing models, massively increased prices, and cut partner programs. The NDP is supposed to function "operationally autonomous," yet this autonomy is an illusion if the virtualization layer depends on an American corporation that can raise prices or exert regulatory pressure.

The Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) documented in 2023/2024 insufficient financial resources and lacking "comprehensive control of all sub-projects." Twenty additional federal projects depend on the Swiss Leadership Network – the major project with the most dependencies in the Defense Group.

Another contradiction emerges within the SVP. Salzmann succeeded with Andrey in the cybersecurity coup, yet SVP National Councilor Mauro Tuena opposed Andrey's Motion 25.3235 for better participation and coordination in digitization. The SVP position of "less state, less bureaucracy" is in tension with participatory structures that require resources – although Andrey's E-ID example shows that broad coalitions ensure public referendums.

Key Findings

  • Political will exists, but Swiss governance structures lack enforcement capacity and resources for long-term digital transformation.
  • Microsoft dependencies run deep: a complete replacement takes years and affects thousands of specialist applications – not just an IT project, but a "generational task."
  • Structural contradiction in the NDP: the Army is building its "sovereign" platform on American virtualization technology, which undermines the sovereignty goal and perpetuates Broadcom licensing risks.
  • France demonstrates governance strength: binding deadlines, central DINUM coordination, and cross-departmental enforcement vs. Swiss participation models without enforcement power.
  • Sociocratic consent model as a solution approach: not everyone has to agree, but there must be no justified veto – worked during the E-ID referendum.

Critical Questions

  1. Evidence/Data Quality: How current are the SFAO audit findings (23155, 24127, 23759) in light of rapid technological changes at Broadcom/VMware since 2023? Is the NDP financial planning based on realistic cost estimates or historical cost increases?

  2. Conflicts of Interest: To what extent are vendor relationships (Microsoft, Broadcom/VMware) documented in procurement decisions? Has the Army evaluated alternatives to Broadcom/VMware or was the selection strategically/technically mandatory?

  3. Causality/Alternatives: Is Andrey's diagnosis – that cost-cutting policies delay programs – supported by case studies or only observation? How might the NDP have looked if open-source virtualization solutions (KVM, Proxmox) had been evaluated from the beginning?

  4. Feasibility/Risks: How realistic is a consent model (like E-ID) for migrating 40,000 workstations and thousands of legacy applications? What risks does a 5–7-year migration pose in a changing threat landscape?

  5. Governance/Autonomy: If the NDP is supposed to be "operationally autonomous" but depends on Broadcom licenses, how can operational autonomy be ensured without contractual autonomy? Does a contingency plan exist for license increases or changes to Broadcom's business model?

  6. Strategy Coherence: How does the Army Chief's warning about Cloud Act risks align with technological dependence on an American corporation for the most critical digitization infrastructure?

  7. Switzerland–France Comparability: Are the French deadlines (autumn 2026) realistically comprehensive or based on pilot scenarios? How do French compliance requirements (ANSSI, Outscale) affect costs?

  8. Resource Gap: Andrey criticizes cost-cutting in digitization. What specific budget resources are missing for the "generational task," and on what cost estimates is this figure based?

Source Directory

Primary Source: Digital Sovereignty: France Tackles the "Bigger Task" – clarus.news (14.04.2026) https://clarus.news/de/blog/digitale-souvernitt-frankreich-packt-die-grssere-kiste-an-20260414-de

Supplementary Sources:

  1. Email exchange clarus.news / NR Gerhard Andrey, April 2026
  2. watson: "Coup in Parliament: Green and SVP Member Override Federal Council" (12.12.2025)
  3. SFAO Report 23759: Steering of Federal Digitization (November 2024)
  4. SFAO Reports 23155 / 24127: NDP ICT Architecture & Infrastructure
  5. Motion 25.3235 / 25.3259: "More Participation, Better Digitization"
  6. VBS: NDP Program – New Digitization Platform
  7. heise online: "France's Plan: Away from Windows, Towards Linux" (10.04.2026)
  8. DINUM: Interministerial Communiqué (8 April 2026)

Verification Status: ✓ 14.04.2026

This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial Responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-Check: 14.04.2026