Critical Analysis: "Easing in Power Supply and Prices"

Source: NZZ, February 24, 2016 – Summary on clarus.news

Analysis Author: Claude Opus 4.6 – from the perspective of a critical journalist, supported by agentic systems.

Article Summary

On February 24, 2016, NZZ reported in two texts about the easing situation in Swiss power supply. The main article reported that Swissgrid was able to defuse the looming bottlenecks thanks to mild temperatures, the restart of reactor block 2 in Beznau, and price-based export controls. The commentary by Davide Scruzzi additionally raised the fundamental question of who is actually responsible for security of supply in Switzerland – and concluded that effective oversight is lacking in the electricity sector.

Critical Assessment from an Audit Perspective

1. Structural Failure in Risk Prevention

By 2016, it was already apparent that Switzerland did not have a robust system for ensuring power supply. The fact that a temporary outage of the Beznau nuclear plant and low reservoir levels (32 percent) caught those responsible "off guard" is, from an audit perspective, a serious finding. There was clearly a lack of scenario planning and resilient emergency concepts. When simple, predictable events – a power plant outage, low water levels – already lead to alarm, the question arises of how the system was prepared for genuine crisis situations.

2. Unclear Responsibilities and Inadequate Oversight

Scruzzi's commentary hits a nerve that still hurts today: The responsibility for security of supply was a patchwork in 2016. Municipal and regional distribution network operators legally bear an important role – but are, as Scruzzi correctly noted, "far away from power plants and international trading." The Elcom as supervisory authority failed to demand more rapid expansion of transformer capacity. The fact that Swissgrid informed with "fluttering PowerPoint files" instead of the responsible department UVEK under Federal Councillor Leuthard demonstrates an institutional diffusion of responsibility that would set alarm bells ringing for any auditor.

3. Short-term Crisis Management Instead of Long-term Strategy

The measures taken in 2016 were almost exclusively reactive in nature: export restrictions, connection of reserve transformers, accelerated procurement of individual grid components. NZZ reported that even the "accelerated procurement" of a transformer for the Beznau substation was described as an "immediate measure for the next winter" – an oxymoron that reveals the system's inertia. While the legal instrument of an export ban for hydroelectric power was not needed, it stood ready as a last line of defense – an alarming sign of how close to the limit operations were.

4. Cost Truth and Grid Investments

Remarkable is the tension already visible in 2016 between the necessity to invest in grid infrastructure and political pressure to keep grid costs low. UVEK lowered the interest rate for grid operators to 3.83 percent, reducing grid costs for consumers by 174 million francs. The electricity industry fought against this change. From an audit perspective, this was a dangerous trade-off: short-term price reductions at the expense of long-term necessary investments in grid capacity and security of supply.

Connection to Later Electricity Shortage (2021–2023)

The analysis of the 2016 NZZ articles reads in retrospect like a missed early warning. The structural problems that Scruzzi and the main article described remained unsolved for years and dramatically worsened:

Import Dependence: Already in 2016, it was clear that Switzerland depends on electricity imports in winter and that import capacities were constrained by missing transformers. When energy prices exploded across Europe in 2021/2022 – triggered by the gas crisis following Russia's attack on Ukraine, the failure of numerous French nuclear plants due to corrosion damage, and a drought that affected both hydropower and the cooling of thermal power plants – precisely this import dependence became an existential threat.

Lack of Oversight Continued: The Elcom, which should have played a more active role already in 2016, was only forced into more decisive action with the acute crisis of 2022. The creation of a hydropower reserve and an emergency power plant ordinance were emergency measures that could have been avoided with better forward planning.

The "Easing" of 2016 Was Deceptive: The headline of the NZZ article – "Easing in Power Supply and Prices" – concealed the fact that structural risks were not eliminated but merely temporarily defused by favorable circumstances (mild weather, functioning export controls). Switzerland lived hand-to-mouth in terms of power supply for years.

Investment Backlog in Grid Infrastructure: The interest rate lowered in 2016 and the political prioritization of low consumer prices contributed to necessary investments in grid expansion and storage capacity being postponed – a failure that would take revenge in the 2022 crisis.

Conclusion

The NZZ reporting of February 24, 2016, documents the roots of a crisis that built up over years and finally struck with full force in 2022. From the perspective of an auditor, the findings are clear: inadequate governance structures, unclear responsibilities, insufficient oversight by Elcom, and a policy that placed short-term cost reduction over long-term security of supply. The then "easing" was not a solution – it was a grace period that was not utilized.

Switzerland should have developed a comprehensive strategy for electricity supply security by 2016 at the latest, including clear responsibilities, adequate reserve capacities, accelerated grid expansion, and a supervisory authority with real enforcement powers. That this was omitted is a systemic failure that has caused billions in costs and whose lessons remain of utmost relevance for the ongoing energy transition.

Analysis created on February 24, 2026 – exactly ten years after the original publication.