How the State, Swisscom and the Army Get Tangled Up Digitally – and Why the NDP Becomes a Risk

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How the State, Swisscom and the Army Get Tangled Up Digitally – and Why the NDP Becomes a Risk

A slightly ironic, but factual analysis

Overview – What is this actually about?

This dossier is a critical compilation of two topics that officially shouldn't have anything to do with each other – but very much do:

  1. The Confederation gives Swisscom new strategic objectives.
  2. The Army builds the NDP with Swisscom, one of the country's most important digital platforms.

Both stories together create a picture that can only be digested with a strong coffee.

Approximately 8–10 minutes reading time.


Summary – So you understand it faster than the Confederation can digitize


Why the NDP is in Trouble – and What This Reveals About the Confederation's Digitization Capabilities

1. Unrealistic expectations for a military-critical platform

The NDP is not an app, but a highly sensitive infrastructure.
Nevertheless, many project assumptions seem, to put it mildly, ambitious.
Budget and time have already been missed.

Conclusion: The state regularly overestimates how well it can manage complex digital projects.


2. Politics sets goals but understands technology too little

Swisscom is the operational partner, the Confederation the strategic owner.
A mixture of political wishful thinking and lack of technical depth leads to mismanagement.

Result: Dependency, overwhelm and a growing blind spot.


3. Delays despite highest security policy relevance

Full operation is planned for 2026 at the earliest – at a time when digital threats change daily.

Source:

Criticism: The pace is in no proportion to the urgency.


4. Critical applications are not yet ready

Many subsystems are still considered risky or incomplete.
Transparency? Rather sparse.


5. Security consumes innovation

More security in Swisscom's strategy is good, but without technical KPIs it remains a buzzword.

Problem: Security without agility leads to slow, cumbersome systems – particularly dangerous in the military context.


6. Platform strategy on paper is not operational reality

The "Cubes" and the modular approach sound modern.
But the digital history of the Confederation shows:
Many platforms remain PowerPoint, few become products.

Examples:

  • eID
  • EPD
  • E-Government harmonization

Contradictions: When the Confederation is simultaneously owner, client and controller

1. The Confederation awards contracts to a company it owns itself

The Army pays – Swisscom earns – the Confederation collects dividends.
A financial circle that pulverizes any transparency.

2. Market neutrality? Only theoretically

When a semi-state telecommunications giant gets government contracts, the question arises:
Would a private provider be more efficient?

3. Role collisions without end

The Confederation is simultaneously:

  • Owner of Swisscom
  • Regulator of the market
  • Financier of the Army
  • Client of the NDP
  • Controller of costs and quality

Conclusion: The state controls itself.
Independent quality control? Not happening.

4. Swisscom is "too important to fail"

Even if performance is lacking, the main partner cannot be replaced.
This leads to a risky power imbalance.

5. Innovation and security goals contradict each other

Swisscom is supposed to be simultaneously:

  • innovative
  • secure
  • profitable
  • ensure supply
  • deliver dividends

Who seriously believes that all of this can work at the same time?


Opportunities & Risks – A realistic interim assessment

Opportunities

  • The NDP could become a stable digital backbone for the Army.
  • The cooperation creates know-how in one place.
  • Swisscom can think big about security – theoretically.

Risks

  • Delays could create security policy gaps.
  • Dependence on a state-affiliated provider reduces market efficiency.
  • Lack of transparency hinders democratic control.
  • The structural contradictions increase the risk of systemic failures.

Look into the future

Short-term (1 year):
More reports on time and budget adjustments.

Medium-term (5 years):
The NDP could work – or become a new chapter of state IT problems.

Long-term (10–20 years):
Switzerland decides whether it takes digital sovereignty seriously – or remains trapped in structural contradictions.


Brief conclusion

The NDP is important, but it is also a prime example of structural perverse incentives in the Swiss state model.
When the Confederation is simultaneously owner, client and controller, it lacks the distance needed for real efficiency.
Anyone who doesn't look closely here risks more than a failed IT project: namely digital sovereignty.