Summary

The new director of the Swiss Intelligence Service (NDB), Serge Bavaud, acknowledges that his predecessor's transformation occurred too quickly and too comprehensively – but led to motivation problems rather than a genuine crisis. After 118 days in office, Bavaud is focusing on three levers: clear objectives, better communication, and operational focus. He sees the greatest threat in hybrid warfare (espionage, disinformation, cyberattacks), which is already occurring on Swiss soil. The service is requesting over 100 additional positions and faster digitalization – otherwise, Switzerland risks jeopardizing its international partnerships.

People

Topics

  • Intelligence service reform and organizational culture
  • Hybrid warfare and cyber threats
  • Counter-espionage and international cooperation
  • Terrorism and political extremism
  • Artificial intelligence in security work

Clarus Lead

The Swiss Intelligence Service NDB is under pressure: massive restructuring under the predecessor led to staff frustration and leadership vacuum. New director Serge Bavaud is ending the "Sisyphean labor" through operational focus rather than further transformation – a clear signal to political decision-makers that stability comes before expansion. The central finding: hybrid warfare is already reality in Switzerland (cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, disinformation, espionage), but requires more resources and faster digitalization to keep pace with international partners.

Detailed Summary

Personnel situation and internal stabilization

Bavaud contradicts the crisis narrative: there is pressure and challenges, but no organizational crisis. However, he acknowledges that his predecessor's transformation was "too much all at once." Personnel suffered from uncertainty, resignations piled up. His response: better objective formulation, transparent communication, clear leadership structures. This is resonating – employees report strengthened motivation through "focus on core business" (actual intelligence services). Bavaud does not specify where his predecessor Christian Dussey fell short, remaining diplomatic.

Cantonal cooperation restored

A major sticking point in recent years: NDB and cantonal police forces worked poorly together. Bavaud has personally visited police commanders, established clear contact points, and improved product quality. Customer satisfaction is increasing, he reports. This is strategically relevant – internal security requires federal teamwork.

Greatest threat: Hybrid warfare

Bavaud calls this the "most likely scenario" for Switzerland. Definition: a mixture of espionage, disinformation campaigns, influence operations and sometimes military drone deployments – difficult to attribute, as attribution is complex. Concrete Swiss examples: cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in Aargau Canton (power supply), disinformation against Federal Councillor Viola Amherd during the Bürgenstock Conference 2024. Espionage is an ongoing issue – roughly one-third of Russian embassy staff are spies according to experts. Switzerland is an operational base for agents from various countries.

Resource conflict and priorities

Bavaud is requesting over 100 additional positions over several years. Justification: the threat situation has worsened, tasks have grown, resources have stagnated. At the same time, he argues that he can work more efficiently – avoiding duplications, leveraging synergies. The crux: International partners expect more information and input, particularly regarding espionage and regional crises. Switzerland cannot be present everywhere with current resources. Bavaud states: on external security, one could set priorities (e.g., less Iran, more China/Russia or more Taiwan).

New threats: Terrorism and online radicalization

The Islamic State is recruiting very young people (ages 10–15) online. What's new: these individuals are radicalizing on the internet but are not going abroad – they are harder to identify. Prevention is not an NDB task, but early detection is. Political extremism (both left and right) is showing growing violence – almost daily new signals. Major events like the G7 in Évian (summer 2026) are being monitored critically. Poor experience from back then (protests 2003) calls for caution.

Artificial intelligence: Both sides benefit

AI is radically changing intelligence work – a new attack surface for opponents, new automation opportunities for NDB. Bavaud warns: "Tomorrow's intelligence service operates digitally" – today it still doesn't fully. Investment and rapid action are necessary. Risk: If Switzerland doesn't invest, it loses pace against opponents and allies.

Personal security measures

Bavaud had to significantly change his life – concrete measures for him and his family, strict communication discipline. One example: he does not use WhatsApp, avoids public WiFi networks. He won't disclose more but is clear: opponents are technologically competent, Switzerland has real adversaries.

Core statements

  • Transformation was too fast: Predecessor overburdened the organization; Bavaud corrects through focus rather than further restructuring.
  • Hybrid threat is real: Cyberattacks, disinformation, espionage are happening now on Swiss soil – not visible like tanks, but strategically relevant.
  • Resource reality: NDB needs 100+ new positions to meet expectations of the Federal Government, cantons, and international partners; efficiency gains alone are insufficient.
  • New terrorism patterns: Very young online radicalized individuals (10–15 years) endanger prevention because they don't go abroad.
  • AI is decisive: Switzerland must quickly invest in digital capabilities, otherwise it loses partnership capability and security situation.
  • Partnerships function, but are fragile: Trust is central – if NDB doesn't deliver, other services' willingness to cooperate declines.

Critical Questions

  1. Evidence/Data quality: Bavaud mentions concrete cyberattacks in Aargau Canton – but details remain secret. How is it verified that these attacks are actually state-induced and not criminally motivated? What evidence is there?

  2. Evidence/Source validity: Regarding the claim that "one-third of Russian embassy staff are spies" – does this figure come from NDB analysis or from experts abroad? How current is this estimate?

  3. Conflict of interest/Incentives: Bavaud is requesting 100+ positions – is this figure objectively justified or does it correspond to a typical budget request pattern in which authorities always request more resources?

  4. Conflict of interest/Independence: NDB works closely with the ETA on counter-espionage. Bavaud himself comes from the ETA. How does he ensure that this conflict of interest does not lead to uncritical cooperation or mutual blame-shifting?

  5. Causality/Alternatives: Bavaud attributes staff turnover and frustration to overly rapid transformation. Could it also be that the threat situation itself (Ukraine, China espionage) led to stress and less so the organizational form?

  6. Causality/Counter-hypothesis: With young online radicalized individuals (10–15 years) – is the Islamic State actually the cause of radicalization, or are already radicalized youth more susceptible to IS propaganda? Where does the causal chain lie?

  7. Feasibility/Risks: Bavaud wants to work less on regional crises (Iran, Venezuela) and focus more on China/Russia. How does he ensure that unexpected crises (e.g., sudden regime change in Iran) don't surprise the Federal Government?

  8. Feasibility/Side effects: If NDB quickly invests in AI automation, how does Bavaud ensure that privacy doesn't suffer massively (algorithms can be false-positive) or that human judgment isn't too quickly replaced by automation?

Source Directory

Primary Source: Daily conversation with Simone Hulliger – Radio SRF – 27 February 2026 download-media.srf.ch – Tagesgespraech_radio_AUDI20260227_NR_0084

Supplementary Sources (Transcript References):

  • Audit Committee of Parliament – Report on counter-espionage and residence requests of diplomats
  • Threat Assessment by the Federal Intelligence Service (current version)
  • Bürgenstock Conference 2024 – Disinformation campaigns against Federal Councillor Viola Amherd

Verification Status: ✓ 27.02.2026

This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-check: 27.02.2026