Executive Summary
The Swiss Federal Council is strengthening data protection and security of the electronic identity (E-ID) to increase acceptance following the narrow referendum result of September 2025. The E-ID is to go into operation on 1 December 2026 despite budget cuts of 1.7 million francs. Key innovations include restrictions on data queries, a public provider register, and the ability to exclude faulty providers.
People
- Beat Jans (Federal Councillor)
Topics
- Data protection and digital identity
- E-Government and trust infrastructure
- Cybersecurity and data security
- Federated digitalization policy
Clarus Lead
Following the narrow yes to the E-ID (50.39%), Switzerland is relying on trust measures rather than a restart. The Federal Council under Beat Jans addresses the main criticisms of opponents through three concrete adjustments: only authorized providers may query AHV numbers, all data retrieval requests must be documented in a public register, and the Federal Office of Justice can exclude providers. Despite savings requirements, the security infrastructure remains untouched.
Detailed Summary
The E-ID law was passed on 28 September 2025 with only 50.39 percent yes votes – a result that reflects deep public skepticism. The Federal Council is responding with a targeted package of measures that tightens data protection and increases transparency. The core measure is the introduction of a publicly accessible register in which all providers must document their data queries and their purpose in advance. The swiyu wallet warns users of suspicious requests and automatically blocks unauthorized AHV number queries. The Federal Office of Justice receives sanctioning powers up to the exclusion of faulty providers.
The technical infrastructure is operated redundantly at two independent locations (PRIMUS Bern, CAMPUS Frauenfeld) and remains unaffected by the budget cuts. Unlinkability – a central data protection requirement – is ensured by issuing multiple technically different E-IDs per person, making individual transactions untraceable. However, the budget cuts of 1.7 million francs decided by parliament result in the abandonment of planned further developments such as international connections, backup services, and third-party wallets. Additional savings rounds could jeopardize the development of further digital credentials.
Key Messages
- Data Protection Tightening: Only authorized providers may query AHV numbers; blocking of unauthorized requests in the wallet
- Transparency through Registration: Public provider register with documentation of all data queries and their purpose
- Sanctioning Mechanisms: Warnings for users and possibility of exclusion for faulty providers by the Federal Office of Justice
- Security Guarantee Despite Savings Budget: Infrastructure at two independent locations, unlinkability through technical multiple issuance
- Possible Delayed Commissioning: Start planned for 1 December 2026; Federal Court still to decide on referendum complaints
Critical Questions
Evidence/Data Quality: What empirical data shows that the identified criticisms (data protection, transparency) were actually the main reasons for the narrow referendum result, and not other factors such as fundamental distrust of digital state technology?
Conflicts of Interest: To what extent do the budget cuts of 1.7 million francs affect the feasibility of the new data protection measures, and who bears responsibility if security gaps arise?
Causality/Alternatives: Why was a delay in implementation not considered in order to fully implement the further developments (international connection, backup services) instead of cutting them?
Feasibility – Technical Viability: How is it ensured that the automatic blocking of unauthorized requests in the swiyu wallet functions reliably and does not lead to false positives or false negatives?
Feasibility – Compliance: How is compliance with the registration requirement by private providers monitored, and what resources does the Federal Office of Justice have available for inspections?
Risks – Legal Uncertainty: How do the ongoing referendum complaints before the Federal Court affect planning certainty and possible delays?
Side Effects – Market Access: Could the new requirements (registration, sanctioning risk) deter smaller or international providers from using the E-ID and paradoxically lower acceptance?
Transparency of Measures: Will the warning messages in the swiyu wallet and the public register be designed so that technically less experienced users can assess the trustworthiness of providers?
Bibliography
Primary Source: Strengthening Acceptance of E-ID with Additional Measures – Press Release of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (EJPD), 25 February 2026
Verification Status: ✓ 25 February 2026
This text was created with the support of an AI model. Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-checking: 25 February 2026