Executive Summary

A critical review of NZZ reporting from February 2016 shows: The "relaxation" in electricity supply at that time was an illusion. Structural deficiencies in governance, oversight, and grid expansion remained unresolved and led directly to the electricity shortage of 2021–2023. Switzerland ignored alarming warning signals for ten years – with billion-franc costs as a consequence.

Persons

Topics

  • Electricity supply security Switzerland
  • Grid infrastructure and investment backlog
  • Governance and oversight deficiencies
  • Energy crisis and import dependence

Clarus Lead

In February 2016, the NZZ reported "relaxation" in electricity supply – yet critical analysis reveals: This all-clear signal was deceptive and masked systemic failures. Swissgrid was able to ease bottlenecks at the time through mild temperatures and export management, but fundamental problems – unclear responsibilities, weak oversight by Elcom, insufficient reserve capacities – remained unresolved. This inaction is taking its toll today: The electricity shortage of 2021–2023 is a direct consequence of missed opportunities from ten years ago.

Detailed Summary

Early warning ignored: In 2016, all warning signs of a fragile supply situation were already evident. A temporary shutdown of the Beznau nuclear power plant and a water storage lake fill level of only 32 percent led to alarm – scenarios that revealed structures barely prepared for genuine crisis situations. Scruzzi's commentary at the time correctly identified: "Who bears responsibility?" The answer was unsatisfactory – a patchwork of municipal distribution network operators, a poorly equipped Elcom, and a political agenda favoring short-term cost reduction.

Governance collapse: The responsible DETEC department received information only through "flimsy PowerPoint files" rather than solid emergency concepts. Elcom should have demanded aggressive transformer capacity expansions – but did not. All measures were reactive: export restrictions, emergency transformers, accelerated individual procurements. Even an export ban on hydroelectric power stood ready as a "last line of defense" – an alarming sign of how narrowly operations were managed.

Cost calculus instead of strategy: DETEC lowered the interest rate for network operators and saved consumers 174 million francs – at the expense of long-term investments. This trade-off between price reduction and grid expansion was systematically decided in favor of short-term relief. The investment backlog in grid infrastructure and storage capacity was the inevitable consequence.

Consequences 2021–2023: When energy prices exploded across Europe in 2021/2022 – Russian attack on Ukraine, French nuclear power plant failures, drought – the unresolved import dependence became an existential threat. Only the crisis forced emergency measures such as hydroelectric reserves and reserve power plant regulations – instruments that a ten-year planning horizon would have avoided.

Key Findings

  • Structural failure: Missing scenario planning and unclear responsibilities made Switzerland vulnerable to foreseeable crises.
  • Oversight deficiencies: Elcom acted too passively; real enforcement powers were lacking years before the crisis.
  • Short-term thinking: Political pressure for low electricity prices displaced strategic grid investments.
  • Import dependence: Switzerland lived electrically "hand to mouth" – fatal in European crises.
  • Missed grace period: In 2016, a comprehensive strategy with clear responsibilities, reserve capacities, and accelerated expansion should have been implemented.

Critical Questions

  1. Evidence quality: Is the retrospective critique based on complete analysis of 2016 reports, or are scenarios overweighted in light of the crisis that actually occurred (hindsight bias)?

  2. Data validity of storage levels: Was the 32% storage lake fill level in February 2016 actually anomalous, or does it fall within the statistical normal range for this season?

  3. Causality: Can it be quantified what proportion of the 2022 crisis stems from forgone investments since 2016 – versus exogenous shocks (Ukraine, French nuclear power plant failures)?

  4. Conflicts of interest: Who benefited in 2016 from lower grid costs? Was DETEC's interest rate reduction decision politically necessary or a genuine oversight?

  5. Alternatives: What concrete strategy would have been feasible and politically viable in 2016 – at what cost to electricity bills at that time?

  6. Oversight enforcement powers: What specific additional Elcom competencies would have been necessary and politically possible in 2016 to enforce grid expansion?

  7. Implementation risks: The accelerated procurement of transformers – why did it factually fail, and were supply chain risks identified in 2016?

Source References

Primary Source: NZZ, 24 February 2016 – "Relaxation in Electricity Supply and Prices" (+ Commentary by Davide Scruzzi)
https://www.nzz.ch/

Verification Status: ✓ 24.02.2026

This text was created with the support of an AI model.
Editorial responsibility: clarus.news | Fact-checking: 24.02.2026