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WEKO vs. Microsoft – Competition Protection, Politics and the Question of Digital Sovereignty

Blog (EN) pending

Fact-Check and Supplement: January 2026

On January 15, 2026, the secretariat of the Swiss Competition Commission (WEKO) actually opened a preliminary examination regarding significant price increases for Microsoft 365. The price increases are real and massive:

Confirmed Facts on Price Increases

Price increases announced for July 1, 2026 (global):

  • Business Basic: +16.7% (from 6 to 7 USD)
  • Business Standard: +12% (from 12.50 to 14 USD)
  • Enterprise E3: +8.3% (from 36 to 39 USD)
  • Enterprise E5: +5.3% (from 57 to 62 USD)
  • Frontline Worker F1: +33%
  • Frontline Worker F3: +25%

Price increases already implemented in 2025:

  • On-premise licenses: +10-20% (from July 2025)
  • Consumer subscriptions (Switzerland): Microsoft 365 Single +20.5%, Family +17.7%
  • Elimination of free offerings for NGOs (August 2025)
  • Removal of volume discounts for Enterprise Agreements (November 2025)

Swiss companies, public institutions and NGOs have filed complaints with WEKO. The authority is now examining whether a dominant market position is being abused.

Sources:

The Strategic Dimension: A Self-Inflicted Dilemma

The WEKO investigation is necessary and correct. However, it only treats the symptoms of a much deeper structural malfunction.

The crucial question is not: "Has Microsoft become too expensive?"

The crucial question is: "Why has the Swiss administration built up a strategic monoculture over decades that now makes the country vulnerable to blackmail?"

Who is WEKO – and what is its mandate?

The Competition Commission (WEKO) is the central authority for enforcing Swiss cartel law. Its mandate includes:

  • monitoring and investigating competition violations
  • assessing dominant market positions
  • controlling mergers and cooperations
  • issuing recommendations to authorities and legislators

WEKO consists of a militia-style commission and a professional secretariat that conducts investigations. Formally it is independent, but administratively it is located within the Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research (WBF).

Critical point:
The commission is politically appointed – thus independence in terms of professional control may be given, but political influence remains structurally possible.

Political Influence – subtle, but real

Although WEKO is formally autonomous, political influence remains a real factor:

  • Members are determined by the Federal Council.
  • Representatives from associations and interest groups also sit on the commission.
  • Economic lobbies exert indirect influence through the composition of committees.
  • Parliamentary initiatives and revisions of cartel law put WEKO under political pressure.

Liberal question:
Can an institution whose leadership is politically determined actually make independent judgments about powerful international corporations?

Does WEKO have the competence to take action against Microsoft?

The crucial question is whether WEKO has sufficient instruments to actually have an impact in a globally dominated IT market.

Legal situation – Strengths

  • It can open preliminary examinations and investigations.
  • It can impose sanctions if violations are demonstrable.
  • It can formulate requirements and demand transparency.

Practical limitations

  • Digital markets are cross-border, while WEKO works nationally.
  • Companies like Microsoft can control adjustments to their pricing models globally.
  • Proving abuse of power in the digital sector is technically and legally complex.
  • Procedures often take years – but in the IT industry, markets change monthly.

Conclusion:
Legally competent yes, practically limited.

Critical Questions About Responsibility: Who Led Switzerland into Dependency?

1. Responsibility of the Federal Administration

To the Federal Office of Information Technology and Telecommunications (BIT):

  • Why was no exit strategy from Microsoft dependency developed over the years?
  • What risk assessments were conducted regarding vendor lock-in issues?
  • Why were open-source alternatives systematically neglected in federal IT strategies?
  • Who bears responsibility for the lack of diversification in critical IT infrastructure?

To the Federal Chancellery and the WBF General Secretariat:

  • Why were procurement guidelines allowed that led to de facto monopoly positions?
  • What Microsoft lobbying activities were registered in the last 10 years and how were they considered?
  • Why are there no binding requirements for technological sovereignty in Digital Government Switzerland (DVS)?

To the Federal Department of Finance (EFD):

  • What are the annual total costs for Microsoft licenses in the federal administration?
  • What additional costs arise from current price increases?
  • Were economic efficiency calculations conducted with open-source alternatives?
  • Why are tax funds spent on proprietary licenses instead of investing in local open-source ecosystems?

2. Responsibility of the Cantons

To the Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK):

  • Why is there no coordinated strategy of the cantons to reduce IT dependencies?
  • Why were federal differences not used to create diversified IT landscapes?
  • Why have cantons like Bern, Zurich and Geneva chosen different paths – and what can others learn from this?

To the cantonal finance directorates:

  • What costs do the cantons incur from Microsoft price increases?
  • Were alternatives examined or are there only supplementary budgets?
  • Who is politically liable for long-term additional costs?

3. Responsibility of Municipalities and Cities

To the Swiss Association of Towns and Cities and the Swiss Association of Municipalities:

  • Why is there no common procurement platform for open-source solutions?
  • Why are SME-friendly, local IT service providers structurally disadvantaged by central Microsoft contracts?
  • How can municipalities break out of vendor lock-ins?

4. Responsibility of Educational Institutions

To universities, ETH and universities of applied sciences:

  • Why are students and researchers systematically trained on proprietary software?
  • Why is there no stronger promotion of open-source competence in computer science programs?
  • How can educational institutions become role models for technological independence?

5. Political Responsibility

To the Swiss Parliament:

  • Why is there no parliamentary investigation into the strategic IT dependency of the state?
  • Why were motions and postulates on open-source strategies not consistently implemented?
  • Who controls whether the administration is putting its digital sovereignty at risk?

To the parties:

  • Why is digital sovereignty not a central theme in election programs?
  • What positions do parties represent regarding the reduction of tech monopolies in the public sector?

Public Sector: The Dependency is Structural – and Self-Made

Federal, cantonal and municipal governments rely predominantly on proprietary IT solutions. This degree of concentration leads to:

  • High switching costs – Decades of habituation to proprietary systems makes migration difficult
  • Structural dependency – Pricing lies entirely with the provider
  • Restricted data sovereignty – Sensitive administrative data in the hands of foreign corporations
  • Low technological diversity – Monoculture increases risks from cyber attacks

Core problem:
WEKO can intervene symptomatically, but the fundamental problem is political-strategic in nature, not competition-related.

Example from practice:
The German state of Schleswig-Holstein has completed the switch to open source:

  • Investment: 9 million euros (one-time)
  • Savings: 15 million euros annually from 2026
  • Effect: Complete control over IT infrastructure and data

Open-Source Alternatives – Principles instead of Products

Instead of listing individual products, it is more meaningful to emphasize the principles that make open-source approaches attractive in the public sector.

1. Independence from Individual Vendors

Open-source solutions avoid binding to proprietary licensing models and reduce the risk of price increases or sudden business model changes.

2. Transparency and Security

The publicly viewable source code enables independent security reviews, audits and adaptations – an advantage with sensitive state data.

3. Interoperability and Open Standards

Open protocols and open file formats prevent technological lock-ins and facilitate cooperation between authorities and service providers.

4. Local Value Creation

Instead of paying license fees abroad, local IT service providers are strengthened who can take over maintenance, support and further development.

5. Scalability and Adaptability

Open-source software can be adapted for specific requirements of the Swiss administration – without dependency on global roadmaps.

6. Data Sovereignty and Data Protection

With open-source solutions, data remains completely under national control – particularly important for sensitive administrative processes.

The Failure of Procurement Policy

The current situation is not an accident – it is the result of decades of wrong decisions:

Structural Problems in Public Procurement

  1. "Best Value" myth: Tenders favor large providers with established references
  2. Missing TCO consideration: Long-term costs (Total Cost of Ownership) are ignored
  3. Lock-in through "de facto standards": Microsoft compatibility is defined as a requirement
  4. Risk aversion: "Nobody gets fired for buying Microsoft"
  5. Lack of competence: IT managers in administrations lack open-source expertise

Consequences for the Swiss IT Market

  • Local SMEs are structurally disadvantaged
  • Innovation potential is not utilized
  • Value creation flows abroad
  • Dependency on geopolitically relevant actors increases

Is WEKO responsible for digital sovereignty?

No – but it plays an indirect role.

WEKO should correct market power, not shape technology policy.
Digital sovereignty is a political-strategic goal that must be shaped through:

  • Federal IT strategy
  • Procurement guidelines
  • Educational policy
  • Cybersecurity standards
  • Promotion of local IT ecosystems

WEKO can only react, not shape.

What Needs to Be Done Concretely Now

Short-term (0-2 years)

  1. Create transparency: Complete survey of all Microsoft licenses and costs in federal, cantonal and municipal governments
  2. Develop exit strategies: Create concrete migration plans for each critical IT area
  3. Start pilot projects: Individual authorities test open-source alternatives
  4. Adapt procurement guidelines: Introduce vendor lock-in risks as knockout criteria

Medium-term (2-5 years)

  1. Open-source competence center: Build up a central consulting and support office
  2. Drive standardization: Open file formats (e.g., ODF) as mandatory in administration
  3. Strengthen local IT economy: Targeted promotion of open-source service providers
  4. Education offensive: Integration of open source in curricula and administrative training

Long-term (5-10 years)

  1. Complete technological sovereignty in critical areas
  2. Diversified IT landscape without dominant single-vendor dependencies
  3. Export of Swiss open-source solutions as an economic factor
  4. Role model for Europe: Switzerland as a hub for sovereign digital infrastructure

The Cost of Inaction

Scenario without change (2026-2036):

  • Assumption: Microsoft increases prices every 2 years by an average of 10%
  • Federal administration currently pays an estimated 100-150 million CHF/year for Microsoft licenses
  • Cantons and municipalities: Another 200-300 million CHF/year
  • Total costs over 10 years: > 5 billion CHF

Scenario with strategic diversification:

  • Initial investment: 200-300 million CHF over 5 years
  • Savings from year 6: 150-200 million CHF annually
  • Break-even after 6-7 years
  • Additional benefit: Technological sovereignty, data protection, local value creation

Conclusion – what is really needed

The investigation against Microsoft is an important signal. It shows that the state is not left alone when a provider exploits its market power.

But:

WEKO has limited means to solve structural dependencies.

Political will is necessary to strengthen open-source approaches in the public sector.

Switzerland needs strategic IT independence, not just antitrust interventions.

What is crucial:
Those responsible in administration and politics must face the uncomfortable questions:

  • Why was the dependency allowed?
  • Who benefits from the current situation?
  • What consequences do we draw for the future?

From a liberal perspective, this means:

More competition through open standards, transparent technologies and real freedom of choice – instead of monoculture through proprietary systems.

More personal responsibility instead of delegation to tech corporations.

More investment in local competence instead of foreign licenses.

More transparency about the true costs of digital dependency.

The Swiss administration must stop seeing itself as a victim – and start acting as a sovereign actor.

Appendix: Further Information

Contacts

WEKO:

Political initiatives:

  • Submit motions and postulates on digital sovereignty in parliament
  • Contact members of the Committee on Transport and Telecommunications (KVF)

Open-source organizations:

  • OSS Directory Switzerland
  • CH Open
  • Digital Society Switzerland

Sources and Literature

International examples:

  • Schleswig-Holstein (Germany): Complete switch to open source by 2026
  • French Gendarmerie: Migration to open source (50,000+ workplaces)
  • City of Munich: Linux migration (with lessons learned)

Studies:

  • Fraunhofer Institute: TCO comparisons proprietary vs. open-source software
  • OECD: Digital Government Review Switzerland
  • Swiss Federal Statistical Office: IT expenditure public administration

Status: January 15, 2026
Author: clarus.news
License: CC BY-SA 4.0

This article is intended to stimulate discussion. We welcome constructive feedback, additions and corrections.

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